

3 1761 01056847 5

THE INDIAN MUTINY 1857

A SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL
MILITARY EVENTS

CAPTAIN F. R. SEDGWICK
(ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY)



THE INDIAN MUSEUM OF
1857.



BRITISH MUSEUM
DEPARTMENT OF PRINTED BOOKS

BRITISH MUSEUM
DEPARTMENT OF PRINTED BOOKS

THE INDIAN MUTINY OF 1857.

A SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY
EVENTS.

BY

CAPTAIN F. R. SEDGWICK


(Royal Field Artillery).

LONDON:

FORSTER GROOM & CO., LTD.,

15, CHARING CROSS, S.W.

Reprinted 1920.



DS
478
S43

PREFACE.

Among the immense mass of literature dealing with the events in India in 1857, 1858, and 1859, there exists no brief general account of the purely military events of the great struggle. This book is a humble attempt to remedy the deficiency, and no one can be more aware than the author of its shortcomings. Nevertheless, in the hope that it may be of some use to those commencing a study of one of our greatest "Small Wars," and that it may possibly afford a certain assistance to those whose time is limited, and who yet wish to obtain a general knowledge of the military problems presented to us by the political exigencies of our great oversea Empire, this little book is now published. With regard to the spelling of the names, I have endeavoured to employ that most generally used. I have however retained the old spelling of the names Lucknow, Cawnpore, Meerut, for I doubt if Lakhnao, Kahnpur, Mirath, would be generally recognized. For any mistakes in the spelling of names I trust I may be forgiven, for the differences in the various authorities are considerable.

For the facts of the story I have relied on the works of Kaye, Malleon, and Forrest, on Lord Roberts' "Forty-one Years in India," and on certain Blue Books most kindly shown me at the Library of the India Office.

F. R. Sedgwick.

Exeter,

Dec. 17, 1908.

CONTENTS.

Introduction.

Chap. I.—India in 1857.

Outbreak of Mutiny.

Chap. II.—The course of Mutiny.

Chap. III.—The situation.

Chap. IV.—Sir Colin Campbell.

Chap. V.—Capture of Delhi.

Chap. VI.—The Siege of Lucknow. Havelock
and Outram enter Lucknow.

Chap. VII.—Sir Colin Campbell relieves Luck-
now.

Chap. VIII.—Battles near Cawnpore.

Chap. IX.—The Doab and Behar. Outram at
Lucknow. Preparations to attack Luck-
now.

Chap. X.—The Capture of Lucknow.

Chap. XI.—Sir Hugh Rose's Central India Cam-
paign.

Chap. XII.—The Final Operations. Some
Lessons of the War.

APPENDICES.

Appendix I.—

Distribution of Troops in India at the outbreak of Mutiny.

Appendix II.—

Numbers of troops despatched from England showing month of arrival in India.

Appendix III.—

List of Regiments despatched from every source to India during the whole course of the Mutiny.

Appendix IV.—

Effect railways would have had on the course of the Mutiny.

LIST OF MAPS.

1. General Map of India.

Showing : Railways existent in 1857. The Grand Trunk Road. The distribution of troops in May 1857.


Inset : Map showing principal railways of India in 1908.

2. Sketch Plan of Delhi.

3. Sketch Plan of Lucknow.

4. Sketch Plan of Cawnpore.

5. Sketch of Theatre of War.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

INTRODUCTION

of Great and Small Wars—Sea Power—The
Causes of Small Wars—The Indian Mutiny
Unique.

Before commencing a sketch of the military events which are collectively termed the Indian Mutiny, it will be well to briefly consider the general nature of wars of this class, and how the Indian Mutiny was quite unique among them. Wars have been divided into two classes, great wars, that is to say, wars between the trained forces of two great Powers, and small wars, that is, wars in which a Power has to deal with an enemy whose forces are not highly organized and trained. It is singular how seldom it is realised in England that our military forces have not taken part single handed in any great war since the time of Henry V. British troops have been engaged very often since that time in war with a great Power, yet hardly a single great engagement has been fought by them in which they were other than a part of an allied army. In the Low Countries, Marlborough's Armies were barely half British; in Spain, Wellington's troops were largely German and Portuguese; the Army that stood Napoleon's shock at Waterloo was less than half British, and the coup de grace was dealt by an army of Prussians.

✓ When, however, the military student turns from the consideration of Great Wars to that of Small Wars, it is interesting to find that for more than a century and a half, there has never been a decade, and hardly a year, in which forces led by British officers have not been engaged in warfare, on the ever widening frontiers of our Empire. The wars thus waged have been of the most varying types, and from them three stand out as pre-eminently great "Small Wars." These three tried the resources of Britain to their uttermost, and in one the intervention of a Great Power led to our ultimate defeat. These three wars are the American Revolution, the Boer War of 1899-1902, and the Indian Mutiny.

✓ All these three wars called for a great transportation of troops from the Mother country, therefore a consideration of the military events of these campaigns brings us first to a consideration of the importance and limitations of Sea Power.

In the American Revolution our Armies (largely composed of German mercenaries) were generally unsuccessful, and finally the intervention of France forced the British Court, whose policy was always disliked by the nation at large, to grant independence to its American Colonists. French intervention in the American Revolution was chiefly valuable to the Colonists, on account of the naval strength of the French nation. Indeed, it was the naval strength of France as much as the American victories which brought the British Court to its knees.

Recent revelations must have brought home to every man in the United Kingdom that, but for our Navy, foreign intervention in the Boer War would certainly have occurred.

During the Indian Mutiny there was no question of foreign intervention, but it must not be forgotten that, but for the Navy, the transport of troops would have soon been made most difficult by any Power disposed to take advantage of our Colonial embarrassments, to further its own ends. Nor can it be supposed that in an Empire such as ours, situations will not occur again requiring a great transportation of troops from the Home Country.

The first essential to success, therefore, in a great "Small War" is Sea Power.

In that great work, "Small Wars, their principles and practice," Colonel Callwell, after pointing out the great dissimilarity of such wars from one another, sets forth the general causes which lead a Colonial Power into small wars and the necessity of studying their origins in order to understand the military operations.

He says:—"It is the military aspect of small wars which concern us, and not their origin and causes. And yet their special peculiarities can generally be traced back to their source. For, broadly, they may be divided into three classes:—Campaigns of conquest and annexation, campaigns for the suppression of insurrection or lawlessness, and campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy."

It will be observed that the first and third of these classes, campaigns of conquest, and campaigns undertaken to overthrow a dangerous enemy or avenge a wrong, are necessarily external wars. The other class, campaigns for the suppression of an insurrection are necessarily internal wars.

The History of Revolts is the History of Guerrilla War, of tedious and invertebrate operations, often of bloody ambushes and bloody reprisals. They are the most difficult of all the operations which regular troops can be called on to perform, they are almost as unpleasant, and as much disliked, as duties which lead the troops into contact with mobs, generally called "Duties in Aid of the Civil Power."

Such wars are always lengthy, the enemy is naturally more conversant with the country than the regulars, and inevitably a certain number of "regrettable incidents" will occur in which the regulars sustain reverses. In these days of newspapers such reverses are invariably exaggerated, and, in a country like England, in which the people are almost wholly ignorant of war, appear serious and unnecessary.

The most serious of the difficulties with which the regulars must contend in all small wars, and more particularly in insurrections, is that there is seldom or never a definite strategical objective for the regulars to aim at.

In external war it is true there is often some form of army to contend with. Its defeat and dispersion however often only complicate matters,

and increases the difficulties of the regulars, as was the case in Afghanistan and the Boer War.

In addition to this, small wars often take place in an almost unknown locality, the country is often difficult for the movements of troops, the lines of communication are often long and difficult to protect, supplies are generally nearly unprocurable.

A consideration of these difficulties has led Colonel Callwell to lay down the general principle that in small wars "Tactics favour the Regular Army, while strategy favours the enemy."

In almost every one of these normal conditions of small wars, the Indian Mutiny was unique, at any rate in its earlier stages.

The lines of communication were good, supplies were abundant, the country was well known, the information of the regulars was probably as good or better than that of the insurgents, the country was practicable for troops of all arms in all directions, while from the first certain armies and great towns held by the rebels afforded strategical objectives to the regular army. These peculiarities arose from the fact that the agitators of the party desirous of upsetting British rule in India found a fertile soil in which to sow its seeds of discontent in the minds of a somewhat pampered and ill-disciplined soldiery. The rebellion was principally a mutiny of a considerable army. The Bengal Army mutinied almost en masse, and formed a nucleus of regular troops round which the discontented gathered. Thus at first several quite considerable armies confronted the British

Generals. Instead of a populace in arms affording no particular objective to the leaders of the British Army, certain collected forces of rebels afforded objectives, which allowed a determinate strategy to be employed from the outset.

In its latter stages, however, the Mutiny degenerated into guerrilla warfare with all its concomitant disadvantages. On the arrival of a column of regulars each member of the rebel bands hid his arms and became "the peaceful cultivator of the soil," only to resume his arms and his trade of rebel when the column of regulars had passed on its way.

It is only with the earlier stages of the war that this book is intended to deal. A full account of the guerrilla operations from May, 1858, to November, 1859, would be very lengthy. The general measures adopted, that is to say, the method on which the British leaders worked in these guerrilla operations is, of course, of great military interest.

This work does not deal with the causes of the Mutiny and Rebellion except in so far as they concern the military operations.

CHAPTER I.

India in 1857—British Troops—Native Troops—Distribution—Causes of Discontent—Outbreak of Mutiny—Action of Government.

By gradual steps the predominant power in India had come to be a British Chartered Company. So great had become the power of this corporation that the British Parliament had intervened in its affairs and, through its representatives on the India Board, controlled to some extent the political affairs of the Company. The Governors of the various Presidencies and the Governor-General were nominated by the Crown. During the reigns of the immediate predecessors of Lord Canning, the Company had found it necessary to engage in Wars with the great Sikh Empire, which it had now absorbed, and also with Afghanistan where success can hardly be said to have crowned its arms. It had also been found advisable to remove the King of Oudh, and take over the administration of his dominions. There can be no doubt that the ever encroaching power of the Company was viewed with much alarm by many of the Princes of India. Lord Dalhousie had as Governor-General sought to introduce many of our western ideas upon the natives. The forced abolition of certain most objectionable religious practices, and the denial of the right of adoption in certain cases, had aroused suspicions. But probably the most serious cause of complaint among the Indian people was

the high-handed methods and manner of many of the officials, who had to do with the regulation of the land in Oudh, in the Southern Mahratta Country, and elsewhere. Many of the landowners (Talukdhars) of Oudh had been shorn of their property, and few could be sure they were safe. What wonder that the people thought the Company greedy of possessing the land itself. A well-known Civil Servant, Mr. Sherer, in his report quotes Bacon's words, "So many overthrown estates, so many votes for troubles."

To guard its great territories the Government of India had a composite force of European and native troops. By a coincidence the European troops in India were abnormally under establishment in 1857, and amounted to some—

4 Regiments of Cavalry,

31 Regiments of Infantry, and

64 Batteries or Companies of Artillery.

These Batteries or Companies, of whom 20 were batteries of Horse Artillery, were composed only partly of British, a portion varying from a third to a half were natives. The total white strength was 6,170 Officers, 39,352 men. The distribution of these troops is shown in Map I. in Black.

The European troops were armed with the Enfield Rifle. The Artillery with 6pr. and 9pr. Field Guns, 18pr. and 24pr. Heavy Field Guns, and the siege guns consisted of 24pr. guns, 8 inch Howitzers, and Mortars.

The native troops, who were armed with the old " Brown Bess " musket, were divided into three armies.

Madras Army :—

- 7 Regiments of Cavalry,
- 52 Regiments of Infantry,
- 4 Companies of Artillery,
- 10 Companies of Engineers.

Bombay Army :—

- 3 Regiments of Cavalry,
- 29 Regiments of Infantry,
- 10 Companies of Artillery,
- 2 Companies of Engineers.

The Bengal Army, with which we are chiefly concerned, consisted of some—

- 34 Regiments of Cavalry
(Regular and Irregular),
- 119 Regiments of Infantry
(Regular and Irregular),
- 32 Companies of Artillery,
- 6 Companies of Engineers.

A regular Regiment was formed and administered in much the same way as a British Regiment. An irregular regiment was commanded by British Officers, but the interior administration was to a great extent in the hands of the native officers. The total strength of the native troops is given as 232,224 of all ranks. The distribution of the troops in May, 1857, is given in Appendix I. and on Map I.

It must be very particularly noted that between Calcutta and Lucknow was only one European

Regiment, that at Danapur. The bulk of the Europeans were in the Punjab. From Calcutta it is 350 miles to Danapur, 600 to Allahabad, and 1,500 to Peshawar.

The increase in the territory owned by the Company, and the consequent distribution of its forces over a far larger area, had coincided with a deterioration of the Native Troops. The bulk of the Sepoys of the Bengal Army were enlisted in Oudh and resented our annexation of the country. One regiment had refused to go to Burma and it had won its point. It is said that the officers were not of such a good class as formerly officered the Native Army. Certainly centralization of authority had been carried to excess, and the powers of the commanding officer of the regular regiments had been curtailed in the most approved Horse Guard fashion, than which nothing can be more detrimental to the discipline of a native corps. As a glaring example of over-centralization may be mentioned that at the Barrackpur outbreak, a certain Sepoy distinguished himself by loyalty and bravery. General Hearsay promoted him on the spot. The General was severely reprimanded for his breach of regulations.

It is beyond the scope of this work to go into the causes of the unrest in Upper India, which culminated in a mutiny of the Native Troops; it is sufficient to admit that the Sepoys had some genuine grievances, which were exploited by certain agitators. These grievances found a culmination in the issue of cartridges for the new

Enfield Rifle, which were smeared with a greasy mixture, said to contain ox and hog fat; as beef is not touched by the Hindu, nor pigs by the Mahommedan, to force them to use cartridges thus smeared would have been to force them to adjure their religion. It has been said that it was as if an atheistical Government had been suspected of having a Cross cut on each cartridge and had ordered their Christian soldiers to spit on it before loading. The simile though exaggerated is not absurdly so; even if such a statement were proved to be a perfect myth, many would still believe it, and a bitter feeling of distrust would surely remain. Many other causes conspired to make unrest: the administration of discipline being centralised, the powers of the commanding officer were weakened, and thus discipline itself weakened. The Sepoys had been pampered in some directions, hardly treated in others—as, for instance, in the matter of service in the Punjab and in Sindh.

In brief the political causes of unrest may be said to have been due chiefly to an attempt to graft Western ideas on an Eastern people. The grafting process is painless to a tree, but not so to a nation, which begins to fear for its existence, its honour, and its religion. The unrest was exploited by agitators, who found a fruitful soil in the minds of the Sepoys.

As is so often the case, it is probable that moral factors had more to do with the great outbreak than political ones. It must be at once admitted that British rule has always maintained a certain aloofness from the natives, which is unfortunate, and galling to the native pride. We are accus-

tomed to panegyrics in the papers and elsewhere on our peculiar skill in governing subject races; certainly the honesty, and justice, and administrative ability of our officials has, and does, improve the lot of our subjects, but there our success ends.

“ We measure,” wrote Henry Lawrence, “ too much by English rule, and expect, contrary to all experience, that the energetic and aspiring among *immense* masses should like our dead level, and our arrogation to ourselves (even when we are notorious imbeciles) of *all* authority and *all* emolument. These sentiments of mine, freely expressed during the last fifteen years, have done me injury, but I am not the less convinced of their soundness, and that until we treat Natives, and especially Native Soldiers, as having much the same feelings, the same ambitions, the same perceptions of ability and imbecility as ourselves, we shall never be safe.” These words are pregnant of wisdom; it may well be that we might all read and mark them to-day.

Various acts of insubordination occurred during the early part of 1857, the 19th Native Infantry were insubordinate at Berhampur. At Barrackpur insubordination was rife, and on the 29th of March a Sepoy of the 34th N.I., named Mangul Pandey, attacked an officer and a white serjeant-major. The man was tried by a court-martial composed of native officers and sentenced to death. The 19th N.I. was disbanded, as also was the 34th N.I. and certain mutinous corps at Lucknow.

Still in the minds of British officials and officers there was no real conception of the latent irritation. The other native regiments went quietly

about their work, steps were taken to allay the suspicions about the cartridges, and the only military movement made was to bring the 84th Regiment from Burma to Calcutta to assist to disarm the 19th and 34th Native Infantry.

Suddenly Calcutta was startled by the news that at Meerut the Sepoys had revolted, murdering many whites; had fled from that place to Delhi; had induced the native troops there also to revolt; and that the old King of Delhi had been placed on the throne of the Moguls, and the Standard of Rebellion raised.

The man to whom the destinies of British India were at this time entrusted was Lord Canning. A more steadfast, firm and able man it would be impossible to have found, but unfortunately his knowledge of India was slight and for a long time he was obliged to trust almost entirely to the advice of the members of his council, who, with the exception of Mr. Grant and Colonel Low, did not prove to be possessed of exceptional capacity.

The Commander-in-Chief in India was General Anson, a splendid soldier and most able man. Lord Elphinstone at Bombay and Harris at Madras were Governors of distinguished ability. Three celebrated brothers governed areas which were dangerous—John Lawrence, the Punjab; George, Rajputana; Henry, Oudh, with headquarters at Lucknow.

The outbreak at Meerut is said to have precipitated a pre-arranged outbreak for Sunday, May 30th.

On the 23rd April, a number of the 3rd Native Light Cavalry refused to receive the new cartridges. Eighty-five men were tried by a court martial composed of native officers and sentenced to ten years imprisonment; the sentence was read on parade on the 9th May, and the men put in fetters there and then, in the presence of their comrades.

The next day, Sunday, at the Church Parade hour, the native troops mutinied, murdered most of their officers who endeavoured to rally them, released the prisoners in the gaol, and made a rush for the European lines. Most fortunately the Church Parade had been put off for half an hour on account of the heat, and the natives found the British troops falling in. They tried to sack the cantonments, and then went off to Delhi.

The Meerut Division was commanded by General Hewett.

The British Troops consisted of:—

The Carabineers.

One Troop of Horse Artillery.

One Light Field Battery.

One Company Foot Artillery.

1st Battalion 60th Rifles.

Many of the Carabineers and Gunners were, however, raw recruits. Most unfortunately, Colonel Wilson, Brigadier at Meerut, did not follow up the Mutineers, otherwise he would probably have dispersed them. There were difficulties due to red tape regulations connected with the command of the troops, and there was delay in issuing ammunition. A garrison must,

it is true, have been left in the station, still a close pursuit by the bulk of the British troops would probably have been successful, but by nightfall nothing had been done.

The Mutineers had time to raise Delhi. The old King of Delhi, who occupied the once powerful throne of the Moguls, gave his name to the movement. The Native Troops at Delhi mutinied and, with the exception of the 74th N.I., murdered their officers. The bulk of the Europeans and Christians were murdered, some after barbarous torture; a remnant escaped to Meerut. An attempt was made by Lieuts. Willoughby, Forrest and Raynor, Conductors Buckley, Shaw, Scully and Crowe, and Serjeants Edwards and Stewart, all of the Bengal Artillery, to defend the arsenal, but the Mutineers were too numerous, and the gallant handful blew up the magazine rather than let it fall into the hands of the enemy; four out of the nine, though severely wounded, escaped.

On the 12th May the Sepoys at Firuzpur, 45th and 57th N.I. and 10th N. Cavalry, mutinied and attempted to seize the fort. They were driven off by the 61st Regiment stationed at that place. The affair was mismanaged and the Sepoys allowed to make off to Delhi.

On hearing the news from Delhi, Anson despatched an aide to Kasauli to order the 75th (less one Company) to Ambala; the 1st Bengal Europeans were also ordered from Dagshai to Ambala; the 2nd Bengal Europeans at Sabathu were ordered to hold themselves ready. Expresses

were sent to Firuzpur and Jalandar to order the occupation of the magazines by Europeans. Two Companies, 8th Regiment, were ordered from Jalandar to Philaur; on the 13th the 2nd Bengal Europeans were ordered to move to Ambala; a third class siege train was ordered to be prepared at Philaur; the Nasiri Gurkhas at Jatogh were ordered to Philaur to escort this train to Ambala, but the regiment mutinied. The Sirmur Gurkhas at Dehra were ordered to Meerut and also the headquarters of the sappers and miners from Rurkhi. The Nasiri Gurkhas soon recovered their senses. On the 15th Anson himself reached Ambala, where transport and supplies were being busily collected; a wing of the 1st Bengal Europeans was at once sent to Karnal, on the road to Delhi, with two H.A. guns and a squadron of 9th Lancers. The Commander-in-Chief found himself unable to advance at once on Delhi, although urged thereto by Sir John Lawrence, and there is little doubt that such a move was now dangerous. Delhi could only have been secured on the day after the Meerut outbreak; it soon became too strong for a small force with very little artillery to capture.

Lord Canning's advisers took a view of the mutiny at Meerut which was not justified by events. They considered the mutiny to be a sporadic manifestation, not a serious disease that had touched the whole Bengal army. Further it was believed that Anson would soon be in Delhi. This belief was shared by civilians and soldiers, officials and merchants alike. An official letter of the 25th of May proves that the Govern-

ment were still blind to the full necessities of the case. Nevertheless, reinforcements were called for from every side.

At present the only European Regiment between Calcutta and Allahabad was the 10th at Danapur. On the 20th May the 84th was sent up country. On the 23rd the 1st Madras Europeans under Neill arrived and also started up country.

Lord Canning also called on the Delhi force to send a regiment to clear the country thence to Cawnpore. How impossible it was to comply with this order will appear in the next chapter.

A request of the Calcutta citizens to be allowed to form a volunteer corps was refused on the 20th.

Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, was a man of most exceptional ability, clever, of the greatest energy, and above all very well acquainted with India. He was at Bombay when he heard of the outbreak at Meerut, and interpreting the affair in a very different manner to that of Lord Canning's advisers, he considered the mutiny to be of the most serious character. He at once, with the consent and assistance of Lord Canning, took the following measures:—

1. He authorized the officer commanding at Disa to send the 83rd and a troop of Horse Artillery to Ajmir, if required, to pacify Rajputana.

2. He authorized the Commissioner of Sindh to send the 1st Bombay Europeans to the Punjab.

3. He despatched a company of Madras Artillery, then on duty at Bombay, direct to Calcutta.

4. He arranged to send the 64th and 78th Regiments, then on the way from Persia, direct to Calcutta, only transhipping at Bombay.

5. He despatched a P. & O. steamer to Mauritius, where the Governor at once placed the 33rd, a company of Artillery, and all the money he could lay hands on, at the service of the Indian Government.

6. He despatched a special steamer to the Cape, where Sir George Grey chartered vessels, and sent the 89th and 95th to Bombay, and later the 6th, the 1st/13th, the 2nd/60th, the 73rd, the 80th, the 31st, and as many horses as he could procure to Calcutta and Bombay.

7. He persuaded Ashburnham, the Commander of the China Expeditionary Force, to proceed to Calcutta and place the services of the force at the disposal of Lord Canning. At the same time Sir George Grey had persuaded the transports conveying this force to go to Singapore instead of to Hongkong direct. From Singapore they one and all bore up for Calcutta.

8. He ordered the concentration at Poona of a column of all arms to keep open the Grand Trunk Road from Bombay to Agra.

9. He took precaution to prevent an outbreak at Bombay itself.

CHAPTER II.

Advance on Delhi—Mutiny at Cawnpore—At Lucknow—Havelock's attempt to reach Lucknow—Mutinies elsewhere.

It is quite beyond the scope of this work to describe the events at each station whereat mutinies broke out. Only some salient features can be extracted. The heroism displayed, the martyrdoms endured, the chivalrous actions performed, these form a page of history of which we and our descendants will ever be proud, and makes clear to us to-day what manner of men our fathers were who took and held India. Let us hope that if such a trial comes again it will be met with the same unflinching calm and determination that our fathers and grandfathers showed in these dark days of June and July, 1857.

As soon as possible Anson moved troops from Ambala to Karnal. Lieutenant Hodson was ordered to Karnal to raise a regiment of Irregular Horse. Meanwhile, Lieutenants Sanford from Meerut and Hodson from Ambala had succeeded in getting despatches across between Anson and his subordinate at Meerut.

The following plan was then formed : General Hewett at Ambala was to retain certain native troops of Patiala's and four companies of British.

The column to attack Delhi was to consist of three brigades.

1st Brigade Brigadier Halifax	{	75th Regiment 1st Bengal Europeans 2 Squadrons 9th Lancers 1 Troop Horse Artillery
----------------------------------	---	---

2nd Brigade Brigadier Jones	{	2nd Bengal Europeans 60th Native Infantry 2 Squadrons 9th Lancers 1 Squadron 4th Bengal Lancers 1 Troop Horse Artillery
--------------------------------	---	---

Meerut Brigade Brigadier Wilson	{	4 Companies 60th 2 Squadrons Carabineers 1 Battery Field Artillery 1 Troop Horse Artillery 1 Compy. Native Sappers 120 Foot Artillerymen with 2 18prs. (these men were to man the siege guns).
------------------------------------	---	--

a total strength of—

About 400 European Cavalry,
100 Native Cavalry,
2200 European Infantry,
900 Native Infantry,
22 Field Guns.

The troops were ordered to concentrate at Baghpat.

This force was to attack an enormous fortified and well-built city, with a perimeter of 7 miles, packed with armed men with a nucleus of some

20,000 well-trained and well-armed Sepoy troops. Lord Canning and Sir John Lawrence, ignorant of his difficulties, were urging haste and speed on Anson.

On the 24th May General Anson died of cholera at Karnal. He was succeeded by General Somorset, as Commander-in-Chief in India, and by General Barnard in command at Ambala.

General Barnard was a most distinguished soldier; he had been Chief of the Staff to General Simpson after Lord Raglan's death in the Crimea; unfortunately, he had seen no Indian service.

In pursuance of orders Wilson marched with his brigade from Meerut on the 27th May. Marching by night and resting in the day, the column reached Ghazi ud din Nagar near the Hindun River at dawn on the 30th and halted. Soon after the halt a scout reported that the enemy were in force on the opposite bank of the river.

Straight in front of the British position, and on the right of that of the mutineers was an iron bridge, which was promptly seized by two companies of the 60th, while a Squadron of the Carabineers with Tombs' Troop of H.A. moved to the right to enfilade the enemy's left. The enemy opened fire with heavy guns, but were silenced by the two 18 pounders. Two Companies of the 60th with the sappers and 4 guns of Scotts Field Battery were sent to support Tombs; the guns now crossed the Hindun River and, when their fire was seen to have unsteadied the enemy,

the 60th charged, thereupon the enemy bolted, pursued by the Carabineers. Five guns were taken. The enemy's losses were heavy, the British loss was slight.

Next day the enemy re-occupied the ridge and opened fire; they were driven back, after a two hours' bombardment by the guns, and a spirited advance of the Rifles.

On June 1st, the Sirmur battalion of Gurkhas, 500 strong, joined the Brigade. On the 4th the brigade again advanced, and passing Baghpat joined General Barnard at Alipur.

At this point Barnard had collected the troops enumerated above, the small siege train from Philaur, Hodson's Horse, and the Sirmur Gurkhas.

The enemy occupied a position at Badliki-Serai, extending from a Serai house, on the right (east) of which was a swamp, to the village of Badli, between which points were placed two entrenched batteries. The position was about half a mile long, the flanks covered by the above-mentioned swamp on the right, and the Western Jumna Canal on the left. A careful reconnaissance was made by Hodson. General Barnard decided to attack in front and on the right flank simultaneously, while the cavalry moving off to the right threatened the enemy's left rear.

At midnight, Brigadier Hope Grant with 10 Horse Artillery guns and 3 squadrons 9th Lancers, guided by Hodson, passed the canal. About 1 a.m. the main column marched. The frontal attack was to be conducted by the guns and two

battalions; Brigadier Graves with the 60th, the 2nd Bengal Europeans, and the Gurkhas went to turn the enemy's right.

At daybreak the guns advanced into action under hostile fire; the 75th and a wing of the 1st Bengal Europeans, with a wing of the latter regiment in reserve, advanced to the attack. The losses were severe and the situation became critical. General Barnard then called on the men for a final advance, the 75th dashed forward with the bayonet and, just as they reached the Serai, Graves's column appeared on the enemy's right. Seeing the chance, Hope Grant charged home with the 9th Lancers, and the enemy fled in confusion.

Without stopping, and in spite of the heat, Barnard pushed his men on. The troops advanced, clearing the gardens and houses till within sight of the Ridge which guards Delhi from the north-west; this was found to be occupied in force. Instantly Barnard formed his plan; he himself, with Graves with three battalions, a squadron and four guns moved to the left along the cantonment road, Wilson with two battalions and all the guns and cavalry moved along the city road through the suburb of Sabzi Mandi, the Gurkhas extended between the columns endeavoured to keep communication. On the Ridge stands a large house, known as Hindu Rao's House, and this point was the objective of both columns.

As the left column advanced the enemy opened fire from the Flag Staff Tower, but the guns, crossing with difficulty a partially destroyed

bridge over a canal about 1,200 yards north of the Ridge, opened fire on the enemy and quickly silenced them. The 60th, 2nd Bengal Fusileers, and Gurkhas then ascended the hill and swept along its crest. Wilson meanwhile, although harassed by the enemy in Sabzi Mandi, succeeded in reaching the southern end of the Ridge and clearing it up to Hindu Rao's House.

“ The object of the day having been effected, the force was at once placed in position before Delhi.”

The losses of the enemy were about 500, and thirteen guns. The British loss was 53 killed and 130 wounded.

While the events leading up to the advance of Barnard's force against Delhi were taking place serious revolts had taken place elsewhere.

At Cawnpore were three Native Infantry and one Native Cavalry Regiment, with one European Field Battery. The troops were commanded by Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler, a most gallant and distinguished soldier, who had entered the Company's Army in 1803, and served in many Indian campaigns; he was, however, over 70 years of age.

On the 14th May news of the Meerut outbreak was received, and on the 19th Wheeler received orders to prepare for the accommodation of a large European force.

To make a place of security for the residents Wheeler had two courses open to him; one, to retire with all the Europeans to the Magazine, 6 miles away—this would have withdrawn the officers from their men and precipitated the mutiny, but would have been the best defensive

position ; two, to occupy a disused hospital and some barracks in which the sick, women and children of the 32nd Regiment were quartered.

The latter course was decided on, and an entrenchment was begun round these buildings and provided with 10 guns. Wheeler's intention not to retire to the Magazine was strengthened by optimistic reports from the Lieutenant-Governor of the N.W. Provinces at Agra. Ominous signs having been observed, on the 21st May all the women and children were brought into the entrenchment, but the officers still slept at the Quarter Guards of their regiments.

On the 22nd 55 men of the 32nd and 240 Irregular Cavalry arrived from Lucknow, and a native noble, Teerek Dhundu Punt, Maharajah of Bithor, better known as " the Nana," arrived with 300 Mahrattas and two guns to support the British. He was quartered at the Treasury. The Nana had been adopted by Baji Rao, the 7th Peshwa of the Mahrattas as his heir, and in the eyes of the natives the Nana was legally the Peshwa, though his claims had been ignored by Lord Dalhousie.

On the 1st June the advanced parties of the 1st Madras Fusileers and 84th Regiments reached Sir Hugh Wheeler. Wheeler then returned the men of the 32nd to Lucknow.

At this date there were in Cawnpore, Europeans :—

80 officers of all arms.

60 men 84th Regiment.

74 men 32nd Regiment (mostly invalids).

15 men Madras Europeans.

59 men Bengal Artillery.

A few civilians—in particular some railway engineers.

A large number of women and children.

In addition there were a few loyal Sepoys and some 300 half-caste children. There was food for a month.

Suspensions of the Nana had arisen.

On the night of June 4th a cashiered officer in a state of drunkenness fired on a patrol of the 2nd Cavalry; this was the spark that set fire to the dry tinder. Next day the 2nd N. Cavalry mutinied, as did the 1st Native Infantry, and the day following, as there was an uproar in the lines of the 53rd and 56th Native Infantry, the guns opened fire on them. The whole of the native troops rose, sacked the Treasury, and marched off towards Delhi. At the last moment the Nana decided to throw in his lot with the rebels, and persuaded them to return to Cawnpore, which they did on the 6th; they looted the town and murdered a number of Christians, and opened fire on the entrenchment. The lines were manned by the defenders and the terrible siege began.

The entrenchment was under fire continuously day and night; food and water were short; the heat was terrific; there were no medicines; the barracks were set on fire, and the women and children forced to stay in the trenches. Fresh regiments arrived constantly to support the mutineers, but no help was forthcoming for the defenders. On the 22nd June the rebels

assaulted the entrenchment, but were driven back at the point of the bayonet. On the 24th the Nana, having failed to capture the place by force, tried guile. He made an offer of terms, which were accepted, and on the 27th the British marched down to the river to embark in the boats prepared for them, according to the capitulation. As the British were entering the boats, hemmed in a narrow ghat, they were foully and treacherously attacked, and for the most part massacred; 5 men, 206 women and children were taken prisoners, and confined for a fortnight of the hottest month of the year in a tiny house. When the guns of the relieving force were almost audible in the distance they too were massacred.

After the annexation of Oudh the headquarters of British administration of that Province was placed at Lucknow, where Sir Henry Lawrence, a gallant soldier and brilliant administrator, was placed as Chief Commissioner. This brilliant soldier fully realized the position, and even in April had disbanded certain mutinous corps. He did not relax his efforts to stave off the Mutiny, which appeared daily more imminent after the 10th of May. On the 30th May it broke out and several of the officers were murdered.

At Lucknow were about 300 men of the 32nd Regiment and a European battery. No serious attempt was made by the four mutinous corps to attack these troops.

On the 31st May a reconnaissance was made by Sir Henry Lawrence. An outbreak in the town was suppressed. The mutineers in the

neighbourhood were dispersed and pursued by a few mounted men, five civilians, under a Mr. Gubbins, particularly distinguishing themselves. Harding's Irregular Cavalry and a few Sepoys stood firm.

At Sitapur, where were four native corps, mutiny broke out on the 4th June, and the bulk of the Europeans there were murdered.

At Azamgarh, Faizabad, Benares, Duriabad, Sultanpur, and other stations, troops also mutinied about this date, in some cases murdering their officers, in others seeing them safely away towards Calcutta. The wanderings of some of these parties were most adventurous. The mutineers joined the rebels at Cawnpore and Lucknow.

In preparation for the event, which he had foreseen, Sir Henry Lawrence had prepared the Residency for defence, and provisioned it abundantly, and called up some native pensioners to assist in the defence.

On the 28th news of the Cawnpore massacre was received, and on the 29th Captain Forbes with some Sikh Cavalry reported the enemy in force at Chinhath.

The Residency and Machi Bhawan were occupied, and a force consisting of—

One troop Volunteer Cavalry,
120 Native Troopers,
4 British manned guns,
6 Native manned guns,
300 32nd Regiment,
240 Native Infantry,

was ordered to clear up the situation next morning by a reconnaissance in force.

On the 30th the troops assembled at the Iron Bridge, and reached the Kokrail Stream without interference.

It seemed that the enemy were not coming on, and at first it was intended to withdraw, but patrols reported that the enemy were still at Chinhat, so the advance was continued. The men having had no refreshments were much fatigued by the heat.

The enemy, numbering some 10,000 men or more, with about 18 guns, succeeded in surrounding the tiny column; the Native Artillerymen mutinied, and overturned the guns into the ditches; the 32nd were foiled in an attempt to capture the village of Ismailgang, which would have served to cover the withdrawal. The Native Cavalry bolted, but a dashing charge of Radcliffe's 35 Volunteers cleared the front, and somehow or other, covered by the Volunteer Cavalry and assisted by native soldiers of the 13th N.I., the Europeans got back to the Bridge over the Kokrail Stream. Here the Volunteer Cavalry again turned, charged 500 rebel horsemen, and dispersed them. Four guns were got into action to cover the retreat; these the enemy dared not face, and the shattered remnant got safely back.

One hundred and eighteen Europeans and 182 Natives were killed or missing; 54 Europeans and 11 Natives returned wounded.

This action seems to have been fought by Lawrence as an administrator rather than as a soldier. A reconnaissance in force is a poor way

of getting information, and it would seem that Lawrence hoped to check the enemy and thus turn them away from Lucknow and save his Province from the horrors of war.

The Europeans at Lucknow were now beleagured in the Residency.

At Agra were quartered the 3rd Bengal European Regiment, a battery of artillery, a detachment of native cavalry and two native infantry regiments. It was some time before action was taken, either by Colvin the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces or by Polwhele the Brigadier.

Finally on the 31st May the native corps were disarmed, a volunteer corps was raised, and Agra placed in a state of defence.

On the 14th June the Gwalior contingent rose against their British officers in spite of the fact that the Maharajah Sindhia held for the British. The Mutineers murdered some 13 men and 5 women and then marched off towards Agra; the rest of the British escaped to Agra, after incredible hardships.

On July 4th Polwhele went out of Agra to engage the Mutineers. They were found about 5,500 strong with 11 guns strongly posted near the village of Sassiah among orchards and enclosures, with their guns skilfully concealed among trees, and difficult to locate. Polwhele formed his troops with the infantry in the centre and three guns on each of their flanks, while the Volunteer Cavalry—100 strong—covered the flanks of the line. The action commenced by

a long artillery duel; during this the Rebel Cavalry tried to attack the guns, but were driven off by the Volunteers. It was not until ammunition was well nigh exhausted that Polwhele ordered the infantry to attack. As usual, the rebels fled before the sight of the levelled bayonets, but the gun teams had been destroyed, and the caissons were empty, no pursuit was therefore possible. As is always the case with Asiatics, as soon as the pursuit stopped they rallied and pressed the column as it retreated. The British losses were very severe, 60 killed and 100 wounded.

Agra remained isolated for many months.

It is an accepted maxim of strategy that before striking it is well to assemble the greatest force possible, but this axiom applies only to pure strategy, and must not be construed literally. Politically it was quite impossible to abandon the garrisons of Cawnpore and Lucknow. To succour these posts it was necessary to secure the long line of communication from Calcutta to Cawnpore.

The most important points of this line were Danapur, Benares and Allahabad. At Danapur were still four native corps, and to watch them the whole of the 10th Regiment was requisite. Calcutta itself required a British garrison, if only to watch the native troops at Barrackpur. There remained immediately available the 84th and 1st Madras Europeans.

The lines of communication to Allahabad consisted of: 1. The Ganges River, a wide and

navigable stream on which plied a number of river steamers. This way was slow. 2. The railway to Raniganj and thence the Grank Trunk Road.

Neill, who commanded the 1st Madras Europeans, pushed up by rail and road with a detachment. Detachments of the 84th went the same route, while the bulk of both corps went by river.

At the outset a jack-in-office of a stationmaster put difficulties in Neill's way. Neill's action was characteristic of the man; he put the station officials in charge of the guard, and reported the circumstances afterwards, and it is recorded that hereafter the railway officials were obsequiously polite. The story is of interest as showing how little the danger of the situation was understood by the Europeans at Calcutta.

Neill reached Benares on the 3rd of June. General Ponsonby, who commanded there, had three Native Corps (one Sikh),

63 Madras Europeans,
153 10th Regiment.
3 guns Olphert's Battery.

It was decided to disarm the Native Troops who were in a mutinous state.

There was a muddle about the arrangements and a sanguinary fight took place before the mutineers were dispersed. The bold action of Mr. Gubbins, the Commissioner, saved the town itself. The Sikh Regiment, which at first was mutinous, returned to its duty.

Meanwhile the Native Troops at Allahabad, except a detachment of Sikhs, had mutinied and were sacking the town.

The moment he heard the news from Allahabad, Neill, who had succeeded Ponsonby, invalided, pushed up from Benares with 50 of his men in 48 hours, in spite of the heat. Next day he took the offensive with his motley band of Madras Europeans, Volunteers, and Sikhs, captured the bridge, received a reinforcement of 100 men, and attacking the enemy everywhere, by most unremitting exertions, subdued the town. On the 17th the British Magistrate resumed his duties. This action of Colonel Neill's is one of the most brilliant of the Mutiny.

While Neill was opening the road to Allahabad Sir Patrick Grant had arrived in Calcutta, summoned by Lord Canning to be commander-in-chief. He proved unequal to the responsibility and remained at Calcutta writing memorandums. To relieve Cawnpore he despatched Brigadier-General Havelock, who arrived at Allahabad on the 30th June.

In the first week of June the 64th and 78th from Persia, and a wing of the 37th from Ceylon with a battery of Artillery reached Calcutta. Other troops steadily followed during the following months, arriving from the Cape, the China Expeditionary Force and Mauritius (see Appendix III.) while in October and the following months the great reinforcements sent from England began to pour into the country. (See Appendix II.)

A Naval Brigade was also formed under Captain Peel of the Shannon.

On the day Havelock arrived at Allahabad, Renaud set off with a column consisting of 400 Europeans, 300 Sikhs and two guns, to act as advanced guard; another party of 100 men and 2 guns were sent by steamer. On the 3rd July Renaud reached Lohanga, where he was ordered to halt by Havelock, who had heard of the fall of Cawnpore. Neill (Havelock's junior) refused to credit the report of the fall of Cawnpore and telegraphed direct to Calcutta denying it. Grant foolishly telegraphed direct to Renaud to proceed. Fortunately Havelock caught him up.

On the 7th July Havelock, having collected transport, left Allahabad with—

A Troop Volunteer Cavalry	20 strong
3rd Company 8th Battalion R.A.	76 „
The 78th Regt. { From Persian }	485 „
The 64th Regt. { Expedition }	284 „
The 84th Regt.	190 „
Irregular Cavalry	30 „
Sikhs	150 „

On the 12th he rallied Renaud and pushed on to Balindad within four miles of Fathpur. The Volunteer Cavalry reconnoitring to the front came upon the rebels, who, thinking only Renaud's party was in front of them, boldly attacked.

Havelock was anxious to rest his troops, but seeing that the enemy was not to be denied, he resolved to fight. He placed his guns in the centre under escort of two companies of the 64th, the cavalry covered the flanks, and the rest of

the infantry formed in quarter column of Battalions at deploying distance were held in reserve.

The enemy having brought up two guns and a considerable body of infantry, Havelock now gave the order for a general advance. The guns advanced into action, and on the threat of a bayonet attack by the infantry the rebels retreated (abandoning the two guns) to the protection of a battery in rear.

The advance was continued, the guns coming into action where possible, the infantry pushing back the enemy, thus, although the irregular cavalry behaved disgracefully, the rebels were driven out of Fathpur and 12 guns were captured. The 30 Irregular Cavalry who had misbehaved were disarmed two days later.

On the 14th June the column resumed its march, and on the 15th the advanced guard consisting of—

20 Volunteer Cavalry,

6 Guns,

Two Companies 64th Regiment,

found the enemy entrenched across the road near Aoung Village. Afraid to attack the tiny force of British horsemen, a large body of rebel cavalry moved round to try and cut off the baggage, but were driven off. The Madras Europeans carried the village with the bayonet and the enemy made off.

Hearing that the bridge near the Pandu River, two miles on, was still intact, Havelock decided to press on. The bridge was at a salient towards the British, and it was found that the enemy had mounted two 24prs.

The Madras Europeans moved forward as skirmishers, the guns advanced three in the centre, three on the right, and two on the left, to cover the passage and clear the opposite bank by enfilade fire; the rest of the troops followed in extended order. The enemy tried to blow the bridge up, but the Madras Europeans closing on the centre rushed forward with the bayonet and secured it.

Starting early on the 16th, it was 1.30 before the column came in touch with the enemy. To defend Cawnpore the Nana had collected a formidable army. An advanced force of several thousand with seven guns had occupied a line of villages about 5 miles from Cawnpore. A few hundred yards in front of the rebel lines ran a line of Mango groves and availing himself of this as a screen Havelock decided to turn the enemy's left. The country is quite flat with a few swampy places. The cavalry and a few skirmishers covered the front and it was some time before the rebels perceived the movement; on doing so they opened a heavy fire on the column but failed to check it. When the rebel left was completely opened up Havelock wheeled into line, the guns came into action, and the force advanced in echelon of battalions from the right, the front covered by part of the Madras Europeans.

The 64th and 78th each carried a village with the bayonet and, rallied by the General himself, again pressed on against the enemy's reserves. The charge was carried right across the enemy's line, while the Volunteer Cavalry (18 men) charged a rebel regiment of cavalry some 350

strong and routed it. The column then reformed and without pause pushed on; it was brought up by a line of rebels holding a village and mango tope. The guns were not up, but the 64th, 78th and Madras Europeans cleared the village and plantation.

Again the column was reformed and pushed on, and on coming over a gentle swell of ground the main body of the enemy was found, nearly 10,000 strong, and only a few hundred yards distant.

The column at once deployed into line and lay down waiting for the guns, but the enemy bringing his guns into action pressed forward; the cannonade became so severe that Havelock rode out to the front and called on the men to charge. Instantly responding, the whole line, only 900 white soldiers, dashed forward; the rebels at once broke and fled.

These actions are of considerable interest. Havelock's bold turning movement in the first engagement was very daring, for he left his front, and therefore his baggage and line of retreat, covered only by 18 Volunteer Cavalry and 100 Riflemen. The distance he had to move was of course small, only about 1,000 yards, but the tactical lesson is none the less valuable to us to-day. The rebel left was only about 1,000 yards from the Ganges River, thus Havelock placed himself between his enemy and an impassable obstacle.

The latter two engagements are noteworthy as showing that thus early in the war, before the

inevitable demoralization of defeat affected the mutineers, a bayonet charge by British troops was a certain solution of the most difficult tactical problem. Unless the rebels were caught in a building or trapped in some way they never stood against a bayonet charge. It is recorded that the 78th when they charged the first time did so in absolute silence, so fierce was their anger against the bloodthirsty murderers in front of them.

After the action the rebels retired on Bithor.

Havelock's worn out troops bivouacked that night within two miles of the Cantonments. They had marched 126 miles in 9 days of the hot weather, had fought six separate actions, three of them on one day, cholera was raging in the force, yet they were never stopped for a moment, had killed many hundreds of rebels, and captured 23 guns.

It was with some difficulty that the troops were prevented from exacting retribution from the inhabitants, when they learnt of the massacre of the women and children which had taken place two days earlier.

Next day, the 18th June, Havelock moved his force to the civil station of Nawabganj and entrenched a well selected position there. On the 19th a force proceeded to Bithor and destroyed the Nana's palace. On the 20th Neill with 220 men and a quantity of stores arrived, and the same evening the passage of the Ganges was commenced. On the 25th Havelock left Cawnpore, leaving Neill in command there, and on the 28th had concentrated a force of 1,200 Europeans and 300 natives and 10 guns at Mangalwar.

On the 29th the force advanced and found the enemy in position near Unao. The road runs between swamps, thus both flanks of the rebel line were covered, but the 64th and 78th forced their way into the village which formed the centre of the position, captured the guns and pushed on past the town of Unao. Here it was seen that a large rebel force was advancing to re-take Unao. Without pausing Havelock pushed on quickly and occupied a bit of dry ground between the swamps, drawing up his force in line. The rebels advanced against the line but could not deploy and fell back with heavy losses.

After a short halt the column pushed on again until it reached the walled town of Bashiratganj, also found to be held.

Sending the 64th round by the left to get in rear of the town, the guns were brought up to silence the enemy at the gateway. The first attempt to storm failed, but after a little more cannonading a second attempt succeeded, and the town was carried. Unfortunately the 64th were late and the retreating enemy escaped.

In two days 100 men had been killed and wounded, and 100 died of cholera. At this rate none would have reached Lucknow, so Havelock decided to withdraw to Mangalwar, which he did next day. Neill was ordered to make a bridge head over the Ganges on the Oudh bank, to collect supplies and in particular to prepare two 24prs., for the light guns were powerless against the villages.

Havelock's retirement was severely criticized, Neill in particular permitting himself to employ most insubordinate language, but it was manifestly necessary.

On the 3rd August a company of the 84th, two 9prs. of Olpherts Battery and two 24prs. joined Havelock, and as the enemy had reoccupied Bashiratganj it was decided to drive them back. The movement was made on the 5th. The enemy had occupied a Serai house half a mile south-east of the town; against this the 84th advanced under cover of the 24prs., while the 78th and the Sikhs with six guns moved round the south of the Serai. The enemy at once fell back on to the villages south of the town. From these villages the enemy were driven by the fire of the guns, and the force, pushing on through the town, found four guns posted on the road, and the enemy drawn up between two small villages. From these positions they were again driven by the Artillery fire. An attempt to circle round the British right was foiled by the Sikhs who had been left at the Serai. The British loss was only 2 killed and 23 wounded, but cholera was still rife in the camp and Havelock returned to **Mangalwar**.

On this day Neill reported that the Gwalior Mutineers were mustering at Bithor. Every effort was now made to complete the bridge and bridgehead at Cawnpore, and this was accomplished on August 11th. The same day Neill sent in an alarming report of the approach of the Mutineers from Bithor.

On the 12th, as the enemy were again near Bashiratganj, Havelock set off to drive them back. They were found posted on the main road, their right on a small village, their left on a hillock about 400 yards from the village, on each flank was a small battery, and the Cavalry were on the left. The 78th, the Madras Europeans and four guns were instantly sent to turn the enemy's left. The guns came into action under a tempest of fire, but seeing a chance they limbered up again and moved off to a position completely enfilading the enemy's left. The rebel lines began to waver and instantly the Highlanders and Fusiliers dashed at them, captured the guns and turned them on the enemy, and pursued them through Bashiratganj.

Havelock returned to Mangalwar, and next day recrossed the river to Cawnpore, under cover of a rearguard of the Madras Europeans, the Volunteer Cavalry, and four guns; the withdrawal was not interfered with.

On the 15th Havelock reported that his force was now reduced to 1,400 men, and urgently required rest to recover its health. To rest, however, was impossible.

On the 16th Havelock moved out to Bithor, and after an eight hours' march came within sight of the rebel position. The left rested in a village on the bank of the Ganges, the right in the village of Maraili, a distance of about one mile. Covering the right of the enemy's position was a deep unfordable nullah, and beyond it were a

body of rebel horsemen. Two guns were mounted near the road about the centre of the line. The enemy's cavalry advanced to reconnoitre, but they, as well as the troops beyond the nullah, were dispersed by a few rounds from the guns. The British Infantry then deployed and advanced without pause or stay, for to manœuvre was impossible. The advance pressed the enemy's skirmishers back to the position, the guns came into action right and left of the road, the two 24prs. upon it, about 500 yards from the enemy's lines; the Madras Europeans stormed the village on the left of the enemy's line, where the mutineers actually stood till the bayonets crossed, and then, pressing on together with the Highlanders, entered the trenches and wheeling to the left cleared them. The enemy fell back to Bithor, through which town they were driven with terrible slaughter.

Next day Havelock returned to Cawnpore.

Behar was ruled by Mr. William Tayler, a man of the greatest ability and energy. The chief town of his district was Patna, and the chief military centre Danapur, at which were the 10th Regiment and four native regiments. The importance of the position of Danapur between Calcutta and Allahabad should be noted. Rat-tray's Sikhs were also in the district and dependable. With the aid of 150 of these men a rising at Patna was suppressed, but Mr. Tayler's representations with regard to the spirit of the troops at Danapur were denied by General Lloyd, and the Government left the decision as to whether the Sepoys were to be disarmed or kept at duty

to the officer commanding. Unfortunately General Lloyd's confidence proved unfounded, but when he observed this, he decided to make the Sepoys innocuous by removing all the percussion caps. The measure was in itself a half-measure, and it was only half performed. On the 25th July the caps in the magazine were removed, the men retaining those in their pouches, and the attempt to remove these the same day caused an outbreak. Even then the Sepoys were not dealt with, but were allowed to go off to Arrah unharmed.

At Arrah a native noble called Kunwar Singh had raised the standard of revolt and was besieging a party of civilians and fifty Sikhs who had taken refuge in a bungalow. Kunwar Singh was joined by many of the mutineers in Behar. This leader was a man of eighty, but he proved a bold and resolute soldier. He had been treated harshly by the Government, and undoubtedly had a grievance against the British.

A relief expedition under a Captain Dunbar, consisting of 300 Europeans and 70 Sikhs, was despatched from Danapur to Arrah in a river steamer. Landing near Arrah, it pushed on fast, but unfortunately the party was caught in an ambush, and forced to retire in confusion, with very severe loss.

It chanced that Major Vincent Eyre, of the Bengal Artillery, with a detachment of his battery was on the river making for Allahabad. When at Baksar,* a station a few miles above Danapur,

* Not marked on Map.

he heard of the movements of the Danapur mutineers, and that they intended crossing the Ganges. There were Government studs at Ghazipur and Baksar, which Eyre secured. On the 29th July 160 men of the 5th Regiment arrived at Baksar, and at the same time Eyre heard of the situation at Arrah, but not of the defeat of the relieving force.

Eyre took on himself the responsibility of making an attempt to relieve the place. His force consisted of 154 men 5th Regiment, 3 guns, and 18 mounted volunteers. Bullocks were procured for the guns, and at 5 p.m. on the 30th July Eyre started.

On the 31st Eyre heard of Dunbar's defeat, but nothing daunted he advanced next day. Pushing on he came in contact with Kunwar Singh's force, which outnumbered his by fully twenty to one, attacked it, and when his gun fire failed to drive the enemy back, he sent in his infantry with the bayonet. The result was not in doubt for a moment. Arrah was relieved and Eyre returned to his boats.

Mr. Tayler's strong measures had kept Behar fairly quiet, but, unfortunately, his chief, Mr. Halliday, did not understand strong measures, and relieved him. Western Behar then degenerated into almost complete anarchy.

Eastern Behar was kept fairly quiet by Mr. George Yure, who succeeded at least in holding the line of the Ganges safe.

Chutia Nagpur was full of disbanded Sepoys and remained till near the end of the war in a state of semi-anarchy.

Eastern Bengal was kept fairly quiet, precaution being taken in time.

It will be seen that not only the maintenance of the districts from which supplies could be procured, but even the line of communication itself from Calcutta to Cawnpore were in constant danger. In this juncture one circumstance, however, proved of great value; that was the assistance of the Nipalese.

On hearing of the outbreak of the mutiny, Maharajah Jung Bahadur, the actual ruler of Nepal, placed the whole military resources of the Gurkha nation at the service of Lord Canning.

Three thousand men were accepted, and reached Juanpur on the 13th July. At Juanpur the Gurkhas were organized and drilled, and their presence contributed to keep the district in check.

Rohilkhand rebelled, and at all the stations the Sepoys mutinied. A noble named Khan Bahadur Khan declared himself Viceroy under the King of Delhi, and his rule was enough to make the return of the British extremely welcome to the unfortunate inhabitants.

The one ray of light which broke the darkness of the gathering storm in the North appeared in the Punjab.

Sir John Lawrence was at Rawul Pindi when the Mutiny broke out. This great man held his province for the British, a province which 8 short years before had severely tried the strength of the Company's Army, and not con-

tent with that alone, he at once despatched reinforcements to Delhi. On the 13th May the Guides marched out of Mardan for Delhi, accomplishing the 600 mile march in 21 days. The infantry kept up with the cavalry with the aid of some bullock carts, in which the men took turns to ride.

The same day a moveable column under Chamberlain was formed consisting of the 52nd, a troop of horse artillery, a field battery, the 33rd and 35th Native Infantry and a wing of the 9th Cavalry. Moving from station to station the column disarmed most of the Mutineer regiments, though some went off, showed the British arms in the districts and kept the province quiet. Finally under Nicholson the column pushed on to Delhi where its arrival turned the scale in favour of the British.

The value of the Punjab is at once apparent on looking at the map. It assured a base to the Delhi force. Without it all the British must have been confined to their respective stations and few could have been saved.

Turning now to the Central Provinces and Bombay, we find that the personal influence of the resident Major Ternan kept the Raja of Dilheri loyal, though he had bitter cause for complaint of his treatment by Lord Dalhousie. The great landowners of the districts of Sagar, Chanderi, Chansi, Lalitpur and Jalaun broke into rebellion, chiefly because of the irritation caused by the Government's land schemes.

At Sagar itself the 31st N. I. remained loyal and protected a number of Europeans.

Among the bitterest enemies of the British was numbered the Rani of Jhansi. This lady fomented the Mutiny. When it broke out the British took refuge in the fort, whence they were treacherously beguiled, and then barbarously massacred by order of the Rani.

In the district of Bandalkhand the chiefs for the most part remained loyal and assisted European fugitives, but a state of semi anarchy prevailed for a long time.

Maharajah Sindhia, as we have seen, remained loyal, but his troops joined the Mutineers.

Bhopal was held for the British by the Begum.

Colonel Durand at Indur succeeded for some time in keeping things going quietly. However on July 1st Holkar's troops mutinied, and Durand with the Europeans retreated, not on Mau, but on Sihor, under protection of some contingents from the Bhils, Bhopal, and other places.

The troops at Mau also mutinied.

Durand was joined, after some delay, by the flying column organised by Elphinstone. This column had been delayed at Ahmednagar, but now, commanded by Stuart, pushed on to Durand's aid and based on Mau, which was itself held by Hungerford's British Battery, was able to hold the line of the Narbadda River.

In spite of very just grievances the Southern Mahratta chiefs were held to their allegiance by Mr. Seton-Kerr, the agent.

Bombay was kept in order by the brilliant Chief of Police, Mr. Forjett.

The Nizam's troops at first showed symptoms of unrest but finally fought most gallantly on the British side. The column organised by Elphinstone to keep the Trunk Road clear unfortunately allowed itself to be delayed for some time at Ahmednagar in consequence of the unrest in the Hyderabad Cavalry.

With the exception of Jodhpur all the great Rajput chiefs remained loyal. To George Lawrence, one of a famous family, was due in a great measure this success. The native troops all over the district mutinied, but availing himself of the services of the European troops at Disa, placed at his disposal by Lord Elphinstone, Lawrence was able to make head against the rebels, and clear the province.

It is apparent that in every case in which the native chiefs had been well treated by the British, those chiefs stood loyal, and it is indeed remarkable that more serious outbreaks did not occur in the Southern Mahratta country, where the land policy of the Administration had embittered the whole of the landed gentry.

Wherever a mutiny took place the turn affairs took almost always depended on the character of the chief British Administrator, or of the officer commanding the troops. If one or both were men of strong character, as a rule the mutiny was held in check sufficiently to prevent damage. In

some cases a subordinate showed the way. Thus at Mainpuri, de Kantzow saved the Treasury and warded off trouble until the Mutineers cleared off, though Crawford, the Commander of the troops, and Cocks, the Commissioner, had gone off to Agra.

In every case in a station in which were quartered British troops, when a decision was promptly come to and boldly carried through, the measures of the authorities were successful. Wherever there was hesitation and half measures there was failure. The lesson is easy to read and learn, it is difficult to put in practise. Even when every corps had mutinied officers maintained their trust in their own corps, and there was more than one case of indignant remonstrance by officers when their regiments were disarmed.

It will be asked how it was that the Bombay regiments for the most part, and the Madras regiments altogether, stood firm. Were not their grievances as serious as those of the Bengal Army? As a matter of fact they were not so affected by recent changes, for the underlying trouble, the disaffection in Oudh and the neighbouring provinces was the chief cause of the mutiny. The mutiny was more than a mutiny, it was part of a rebellion. 2

CHAPTER III.

The Situation—Lines of Communication—the Theatre of War—the Climate—Disease—Transport—Time from England—Immediate Reinforcements—Resources of Material—Instant Action of Government.

In the first chapter we have seen how dangerous was the British position in Upper India at the time of the outbreak at Meerut. In the last chapter we have seen that the rebellion spread gradually over an immense territory. Oudh, Rohilkhand, and the Doab, were completely lost, as also were the districts of Banda, Kalpi and Jhansi. Stuart and Durand were with difficulty maintaining the line of the Narbadda, Chutia Nagpur and Behar were in a state of anarchy. Fortunately, however, Madras and the Punjab were quiescent. The disturbed area could be entered from four directions :—

1. From Calcutta via

The Ganges River to Allahabad and thence by the Grand Trunk road through Cawnpore ;

Or by railway to Raniganj and thence by the road to Allahabad. Allahabad is nearly 600 miles from Calcutta ; Delhi about 900 miles.

The most important points on the Ganges route were Danapur, Benares, and Allahabad, which lies at the junction of the Jumna and Ganges rivers.

Both these streams are navigable for boats for a considerable distance above their junction; the tributaries of the Ganges, the Gogra and Gandak on the left bank and the San on the right bank are also navigable for a considerable distance.

2. From Madras via Jabalpur and Banda, through Bandalkhand.

3. From Bombay via the Grand Trunk road. A force from this direction would be able to base itself on Mau and advance through Jhansi on Kalpi, or Agra.

4. From the Punjab via Ambala. We have seen that already the first and last routes had been employed, and how the others were used will appear in the course of this work.

The Theatre of War may be divided into two parts. Oudh and the surrounding districts form a great plain, very nearly flat, of considerable fertility, and drained by the great Ganges and Jumna rivers and their tributaries. This plain is covered closely with towns and villages; of the roads crossing it at that time few were metalled. In the rains the whole country becomes swampy. A peculiarity of the country are the watercourses, known as nullahs, which have the appearance of cracks or fissures in the ground and present formidable obstacles to the movement of guns and even of cavalry.

In Central India and Bandalkhand the plain is diversified with hilly, almost mountainous, country. The districts were not so well popu-

lated, and jungle covered a large part of the country.

To describe the climate of this area the year may be divided into three portions, the hot weather, the cold weather, and the rains. The hot weather from April to July, the rains middle of July to end of September, the cold weather October to March. During the hot weather and the rains it was supposed that British troops could not possibly withstand the rigours of the climate.

The most serious disease from which British troops suffer in the East is cholera, and it was rife at first among the troops. Dysentery, typhoid, and sunstroke accounted for the remainder of the long sick roll.

The transport of a column operating in the East is always a matter of great difficulty. The bulk is pack transport, the pack animals being elephants, camels, mules, ponies, donkeys, and oxen. Bullock carts are also largely employed. The heavy field artillery was dragged by elephants and bullocks. The horse supply was considerable in Madras, and about 2,500 horses were sent from Cape Colony.

From England the times for voyages averaged as follows during the war :—

To Calcutta by steamer 82 days; by sailing ship 116 days.

To Madras by steamer 90 days; by sailing ship 131 days.

To Bombay by steamer 76 days; by sailing ship 118 days.

Speaking generally we may say nearly three months by steamer and nearly 4 by sailing ship were required to convey reinforcements from England, thus it was October before the first of these arrived (see Appendix II).

Later in the War the overland route was employed for troops, the time to Bombay or Karachi being about four weeks. Only a few thousand men were sent by this route.

The immediate reinforcements in sight therefore were only small. Lord Canning at first received a wing of an infantry regiment from Ceylon, 2 regiments from Mauritius, 3 regiments from the Cape and 4 regiments from the Chinese Expedition, besides some artillery and engineers, and more important still, a supply of doctors and medical stores.

As has so often been the case with the British Army, a long peace found the reserves of warlike material at a low ebb. True, ammunition for the Enfield rifle was easy to manufacture, still easier was it to make ammunition for the Artillery, but to provide other supplies, vehicles, gun carriages, harness and so forth, required time. The transport for a large force was non-existent and even for a small force it took time to collect. It has been noted that Anson was delayed at Ambala, and Havelock at Allahabad, for a considerable time from this cause, and the narrative will show further cases of similar delay.

CHAPTER IV.

Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell.—Organization pressed on.—Plans.—Outram and Havelock.—Delhi.—Central India.—Summary.

On the news of the outbreak in India and Anson's death reaching London, Sir Colin Campbell was asked to go out there as Commander-in-Chief. The man on whom the eyes of every one in India was now turned was a war-worn veteran of 65 years of age.

His father was a working carpenter in Glasgow, his mother was of good family, and her brother obtained for the lad a commission in the 9th Regiment. He saw service early in the Peninsula, where he distinguished himself greatly, particularly at the storm of San Sebastian. Years of garrison work followed and then he saw service in China, and in the Second Sikh War as Brigadier. He commanded the Highland Brigade in the Crimea, and had not expected further employment in the field. But the hour called for the man, and he came out to India as Commander-in-Chief.

On the 17th August, the day on which Sir Colin Campbell arrived at Calcutta, it may be said that the blaze of mutiny had reached its greatest heat, and from now on began to decline. True, sparks were still carried from the great central conflagration to light up sporadic outbursts in other places, but on the whole the forces of order now

began to gain control. That this was so was due in no small measure to the personal qualities of Sir Colin Campbell, and his Chief of the Staff General Mansfield, who worthily supported him. At this moment the North-West Provinces Delhi, Rohilkhand, and Oudh, were lost. The Punjab though passive was really in a state of ferment.

Central India though not quite lost was yet in a state of anarchy.

Rajputana was doubtful. In Behar and Chutia Nagpur, the mutineer Sepoys, and Kunwar Singh, forced the British to keep close to their cantonments. The insurgents disposed of the revenues and produce of a vast and wealthy district, they had at their service fully 100,000 trained men, a numerous Cavalry and a well equipped Field Artillery, besides large numbers of guns of position, and enormous supplies of ammunition. Behind these trained troops stood the levies of "Badmashes," swashbucklers all ready for a fight, and the armed retainers of the Chiefs. The native drilled troops were called Nujibs.

To compete with this great force the British had a besieged garrison at Lucknow, and still held Agra and Sagar. A force of some 7,000 men were before Delhi endeavouring to capture that great and politically extremely important town, which was defended by a large army. A force of some 2,000 men at Cawnpore had fallen back baffled from the attempt to relieve Lucknow. These two principal forces were based, the former in the Punjab, the latter on Bengal.

The lines of communication of the former were, owing to Sir John Lawrence's ability, fairly safe.

A siege train was being collected at Lahore, and with its arrival at Delhi, much might be hoped.

The safety of the Lines of Communication between Cawnpore and Bengal was however most precarious. The Ganges with the fall of the waters after the rains are over would become a long and circuitous route. The other line, that of the railway to Raniganj and thence the Grand Trunk road via Allahabad, must be largely employed.

The troubles in Behar had induced the Civil Authorities to requisition detachments passing on their way to the front for immediate protection, thus the problem of reinforcing Havelock at Cawnpore was a complicated one.

With regard to the other districts. The Nepalese troops occupied Juanpur and Azimgurh. In Bandalkhand Willoughby Osborne was with some difficulty maintaining the British supremacy. Nagpur was kept in check by Mr. Plowden with some Madras troops and a company of European Madras Artillery. The Nizam had been held by Major Davidson and his able minister, and the Hyderabad troops later on did yeoman service for the British. Durand and Stuart at Mau were holding the line of the Narbadda and keeping open communication with Bombay. George Lawrence was to be relied on to hold Rajputana, the mutinous troops having left that district.

Thus terribly serious though the situation was one feature there was of good in it. Sir Colin was able to see almost the full extent of the trouble. The sore on the body politic of India, like a boil which has reached its worst, was now most painful, but on the other hand it had come to a head, and was ready for the lancet.

Sir Colin's first care was organization. The Government and Sir Patrick Grant had done nothing. No means of transport were prepared; there were no horses; rifle ammunition was deficient; guns, gun carriages and harness were required; supplies were short; English speaking servants for the regiments shortly expected were not yet procured. All these wants Sir Colin set himself to remedy.

To improve the means of transport, a bullock train was established on the Grand Trunk Road from Raniganj to Allahabad. Supplies were sent up by river, men were sent up to Allahabad by rail and bullock train.

Besides the troops at Cawnpore there were already available the 53rd at Fort William, a wing of the 37th, the 10th at Danapur, the 5th, various Artillery units, and the 90th. A Volunteer force of all arms was raised in Calcutta, a body of so-called Yeomanry, mostly adventurers, was also raised, and a number of out-of-work European sailors were enlisted in Calcutta for garrison duty. Other reinforcements were daily expected from the Cape, the Mauritius and the China force. Last, but not least, the Naval Brigade, under Captain Peel, R.N., was now ready to be sent to the front.

The troops required on the Lines of Communication were numerous. The 10th, a wing of the 37th, the 53rd, the Yeomanry, etc., were all thus utilized, besides detachments from most of the corps at the front.

To secure the safety of the Grand Trunk Road small movable columns were formed; unfortunately, as has been noted, the Civil Authorities often requisitioned on these columns, which were thus diverted from their specified duty.

An August 31st, Sir James Outram arrived in Calcutta. He was posted to command the Danapur and Cawnpore Divisions which were united into one command. Outram proceeded at once to his district taking with him that great soldier Robert Napier, R.E., as Chief of the Staff. Having put matters in order at Danapur he pushed on to Allahabad.

Outram now proposed to Sir Colin that he should withdraw Havelock's exhausted troops to Allahabad and himself organize at Benares a column to move on Lucknow direct from that place instead of via Cawnpore. Outram believed the Sye River Bridge to be destroyed. In fact, this was not found to be the case.

Meanwhile Havelock, who did not know yet that he was under Outram's command, had reported to Calcutta that the health of his troops was so bad that he must be reinforced or gradually disappear by disease. Reinforcements would enable his troops to rest and recover their health.

In view of the menacing position of the Gwalior Troops, who were near Kalpi, Sir Colin decided

that Outram's first task must be to reinforce Havelock who in his opinion must not retrograde from Cawnpore; after that he could select his own route for the advance to Lucknow.

In pursuance of these orders, on the 5th Sept. the 5th Regt., and Eyre's Battery, left Allahabad, and the same night Outram with the 90th marched. A detachment of rebels who had crossed the Ganges and were threatening Allahabad were followed by Eyre with a party, caught and pursued to their boats, and almost annihilated. On the 15th Outram arrived at Cawnpore, where he took over the duties of Civil Commissioner, insisting on leaving to Havelock the command of the troops, an action as generous as it was chivalrous.

Havelock's force at this time consisted of the greater part of the 5th, 64th, 78th, 84th, 90th Regiments, the 1st Madras Europeans, Brasyers, Sikhs, the Volunteer Cavalry, a squadron 12th Irregulars, 30 guns.

Even while Sir Colin was "organizing victory" at Calcutta, Nicholson was approaching Delhi with swift steps, the events that followed his arrival require a chapter to themselves.

For the pacification of Central India Sir Robert Hamilton, a most distinguished official, was appointed Governor-General's Agent, and it was decided that columns from Bombay and from Madras should co-operate in the action. The Bombay column was to be based on Mau (Mhow), and its nucleus would be Stuart's and Durand's force already there. It was to be commanded by

Sir Hugh Rose and was to consist of two brigades with a strength of one British Cavalry Regiment, two European Infantry Regiments and three batteries; four Regiments Native Cavalry, three Regiments Native Infantry, three companies of Sappers and a siege train. The bulk of the native troops belonged to the Hyderabad contingent. This column was to attack Jhansi and then sweep the country as far as Kalpi. The Madras column, to be commanded by Whitlock, was to consist of one European and two Native Cavalry Regiments; five Batteries; two Regiments British Infantry; three and a half Regiments Native Infantry, a detachment of Engineers. This force, based on Jabalpur, was to clear the country west of that point and Allaha-bad, and crossing Bandalkhand to reach Banda.

It would however be a long while before these two columns could be ready to move.

While all these plans were being formed and the active work of the various departments was beginning to bear fruit, reinforcements continued to arrive. More of the troops of the China Expeditionary Force, 23rd, part 82nd, 93rd, two Companies R.A., one Company R.E., were shortly followed by the first troops despatched from Cape Colony, half 13th, one Company R.A. with 60 horses. Other horses began to arrive from the Cape, and supplies of all sorts began to pour in.

Thus Sir Colin might well hope that with Lucknow relieved and Delhi captured, and arrangements made to deal with Central India,

he would soon be able to collect such a force as would be able to restore British supremacy in Oudh, Rohilkhand, and the North-west Provinces.

It must be noted however that the first task must be to succour the garrison of Lucknow. It would not be till this was safely accomplished that final plans to crush the rebels could be formulated. This operation took many weary months.

Leaving this side of the theatre of war for the moment it will be well to see how the British fared at Delhi.

CHAPTER V.

Delhi.—The Ridge.—The besieging force itself besieged.—Reinforcements.—John Nicholson.—The Storm.

On the 8th June Barnard had occupied Hindu Rao's Ridge. This ridge is about 2 miles long, extending from N.N.E. to S.S.W. from the Banks of the Jumna River to just north of Delhi; it has a command of some sixty feet over the town.

The position was one of some strength, but the right was enveloped by the suburbs of Delhi, Sabzi Mandi, Kishenganj, and Paharipur.

The Town of Delhi is enclosed with a wall some 7 miles long provided with bastions at intervals, covered by a glacis and deep ditch.

The strength of Barnard's force was inadequate to invest Delhi, and in truth the besiegers were themselves besieged on the ridge. On the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th June attacks were made on the British position by the rebels, but were repulsed.

On the 17th the enemy occupied and commenced to entrench the Eadgah Knoll, which is a southern continuation of the outcrop which forms the Ridge. Two columns proceeded to attack the enemy, and succeeded in driving him off.

On the 19th June the enemy made a most dangerous attack on the rear, moving through Sabzi Mandi. They were repulsed after a severe action by the cavalry with some guns.

On the 23rd June a serious attack from Sabzi Mandi was made on the front and right. After this action Sabzi Mandi was held by a British piquet.

On the 24th Neville Chamberlain with some reinforcements arrived, and by the end of the month the British force amounted to 6,600 men.

It was intended to carry the place by a coup de main on the 3rd, but the intention was fortunately abandoned for it could hardly have succeeded without any proper preparation by siege artillery.

On the 4th a large force of the enemy was seen making for Alipur. Major Coke with 300 cavalry 800 infantry and 12 guns was sent to overtake them. The D.A.Q.M.G. of the column was Lieutenant F. S. Roberts, Bengal Artillery. Next morning Coke found and dispersed the enemy. The latter rallied, as they were not pursued on account of the great heat, and attacked Coke's infantry which had halted, but they were beaten off; the cavalry and guns had already marched off but returned on hearing the firing, and the cavalry pursued the enemy for some distance.

On the 6th General Barnard died and General Reed assumed command. The canal bridges were now destroyed and the town water supply cut.

On the 9th July the rebel cavalry succeeded in surprising the piquet called the Mound Piquet formed by a troop of the Carabineers, most of whom were mere recruits, who bolted back to camp, abandoning a section of Tomb's Battery of Horse Artillery. The rebel Sowars dashed on into the camp and called on the native gunners of

the Horse Artillery to mutiny, but the men stood firm and the Sowars were driven out. Meanwhile a large force of the rebels had attacked Sabzi Mandi. Desperate hand to hand fighting took place, but the attacks were beaten off with heavy losses. The British loss on this date was 52 killed and 168 wounded.

On the 14th July another attack was made, chiefly against the Sabzi Mandi piquet. In the afternoon a column was sent out to disperse the attackers. With severe fighting the enemy were driven through the gardens by the 1st Bengal Europeans and the 1st Punjab Infantry Regiment (Coke's Rifles), while Hodson, leading the Guides, Gurkhas, and some of the Fusiliers, moved along the Grand Trunk Road. On reaching the city wall the force had naturally to retire. As proved so often the case, as soon as the retirement commenced the natives took heart and pressed on in pursuit. The Guides Infantry however occupied various enclosures and an old Temple known as the "Sammy House," turning sharply against the enemy when possible with the bayonet, with the result that the rebels lost very heavily. The British loss this day amounted to 15 killed and 193 wounded. The enemy's loss was estimated at a thousand.

On the 17th July General Reed was invalided and Brigadier Archdale Wilson assumed command.

On the 18th the Rebels again attacked Sabzi Mandi and the ridge but were beaten off. By this time Sabzi Mandi had been thoroughly

cleared and breastworks constructed to connect with the ridge, the Sammy House fortified, and the whole position much strengthened.

On the 23rd the Rebels occupied Ludlow Castle but were driven out.

On the 28th a column of the enemy was observed to be throwing a bridge over the canal, with the object evidently of making a sally to prevent the arrival of the expected reinforcements, but the bridge was destroyed by a flood.

The 1st August was the day of a great Mahomedan festival, and a fierce attack was made on the entrenchments which lasted all night, but it was eventually beaten off.

On the 7th an attack was again made, and Ludlow Castle occupied by the enemy. A counter attack was made and rebel guns were captured and brought in. In this action our losses were severe, in all 118 killed and wounded.

On this day General Nicholson arrived in camp and his column followed on the 14th. It consisted of One Battery Horse Artillery ;

52nd Regiment ;

Rest of the 61st Regiment ;

2nd Punjab Infantry ;

Two hundred Multani Horse.

News having been received that the enemy had sent a detachment to interrupt the lines of communication, Hodson with 250 sabres, all natives, was sent to watch them. In spite of the rains he reached Rohtak that night and next day was attacked by about 1,200 men. He promptly charged, and the rebels took refuge in some

buildings. Hodson made his men simulate retreat, and having drawn the enemy out turned and charged, cutting down many. The enemy left 50 dead on the ground, Hodson's loss was 13 wounded.

On the 24th a large force of the enemy with 18 guns left to cut off the arrival of the siege train, which was shortly expected. Nicholson with the 61st, 1st Bengal Europeans, 2nd Punjabis, 9th Lancers, Guides Cavalry, and 18 guns left in pursuit and in spite of appalling weather caught up the rebels about sunset at a branch of the Najafgarh Canal which was unfordable. The enemy's position extended for about 3,000 yards with their right occupying a village near a bridge over the Canal, and their left on a hillock and a serai. Nicholson at once decided to attack this hillock and the serai. Under cover of the guns the infantry advanced in line and after storming the hillock changed front and bore down on the enemy's right. The mutineers gave way, but a party held out in a village in rear and slipped off in the night. The British loss was just over 100 killed and wounded.

No further attempt was made by the rebels to prevent the arrival of the siege train, which reached Delhi on September 3rd. It consisted of 32 heavy guns and ample supplies of ammunition. The total available British strength on this date amounted to 6,500 Infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 600 Artillery; of this total 3,317 were British. Cholera, dysentery, and typhus had been more destructive than the enemy's fire, and the average

parade strength of a British battalion at this date was only about 300.

It was decided to push on the siege at once. The front to be attacked was to the left (east) of this work. It included the Mori, Kashmir, and Water Bastions. A six gun battery was constructed just east of the Sammy House to keep down the fire of the Mori Bastion, and prevent sorties from the Lahore Gate round the right of our line of breaching batteries. The left of the line of breaching batteries was protected by the river.

During the night 7th—8th September the first battery was traced 700 yards from the Mori Bastion. The rebels discovered the proceeding and opened fire but soon ceased. By dawn of the 8th one gun was mounted and soon the whole battery, five 18 pounders, one 8-inch Howitzer, and four 24 pounders were mounted and opened fire. By the afternoon the Mori Bastion was a heap of ruins.

On the evening of the 8th Ludlow Castle and a garden near by called the Kudsia Bagh were occupied.

During the night 9th—10th, No. 2 Battery was constructed in front of Ludlow Castle and mounted with seven 8 inch Howitzers, two 18 pounders, and nine 24 pounders. It was destined to destroy the Kashmir Bastion.

On the night 10th—11th, Nos. 3 and 4 Batteries were constructed and the guns mounted under severe fire. No. 3 Battery about 150 yards from the Water Bastion consisted of six 18 pounders.

No. 4 Battery in the Kudsia Bagh consisted of ten heavy mortars. At 8 a.m. on the 11th Nos. 2 and 4 Batteries opened fire and on the 12th No. 3 Battery.

On the night 13th—14th the breaches were examined by four engineer officers, Medley, Lang, Horne, and Greathed, and pronounced practicable. The assault was then ordered for the 14th.

The force was divided into five columns—

No. 1. Brigadier General Nicholson.

75th Regiment;

1st Bengal Europeans;

2nd Punjab Infantry;

Total 550 Europeans and 450 natives.

It was to storm the Kashmir Bastion.

No. 2. Brigadier Jones.

The 8th Regiment.

The 2nd Bengal Europeans;

The 4th Sikhs;

Total 500 Europeans and 350 natives.

It was to storm the Water Bastion.

No. 3. Colonel Campbell.

52nd Light Infantry;

Kumaon Battalion of urkhas;

1st Punjab Infantry;

Total 250 Europeans, 750 natives.

It was to blow in and storm the Kashmir Gate.

No. 4. Major Reid.

Sirmur Battalion of Gurkhas;

The Guides;

Some of the piquets;

The Kashmir contingent;

In all some 100 Europeans and 2,000 natives.

It was to attack Kishenganj and Paharipur, and support the main attack by demonstrating against the Lahore Gate, which it was to enter after the walls were captured.

No. 5. Reserve Column. Brigadier Longfield.
61st Regiment;
4th Punjab Infantry;
Baluch and Jhind contingents;
450 Europeans, 1,000 natives.

The 60th Rifles were to cover the front of the three storming columns.

The remainder of the force remained in camp under arms.

The Columns reached their positions long before dawn and were formed in the usual way, storming party, support, and reserve. Many of the men, however, were on outpost duty, and it was full day before they rejoined their corps.

At last Nicholson gave orders to the 60th to advance, and as soon as they were established within rifle shot of the breaches he sent his stormers forward, and led his column in person. Nos. 1 and 2 Columns passed the breaches, No. 3 Column also attained its object. The party of engineers under Horne and Salkeld succeeded in blowing in the Kashmir Gate in spite of the murderous fire which laid Salkeld and most of the party low.

No. 4 Column had at first some success but the rebels swarmed out to attack it, and on the death of Reid it fell back to the neighbourhood

of the Canal. The enemy, continuing to pour out of the Lahore Gate, threatened to overwhelm the column and reach the camp, but the Cavalry and Horse Artillery under Hope Grant advanced and drove the enemy back, until the ground prevented further movements of cavalry. Hope Grant and his troopers were obliged to remain halted under fire for some hours.

The Reserve Column followed No. III. through the Kashmir Gate and occupied the houses near. As a consequence of these operations, at dusk a part of the walls of Delhi were in our hands.

During the 17th and 18th, by carefully pushing forward from point to point under cover of fire from the field guns, much ground was made in the City, and the magazine was captured. The siege guns meanwhile shelled the Palace and Jumma Masjid.

On the 19th and 20th the Burn Bastion, the Lahore Gate, and the Garstin Bastion, were captured. On the afternoon of the 20th the Palace was captured. Next day Hodson captured the king, and on the 23rd captured his sons; having only a small party with him and fearing that these men would escape, for the demeanour of the rabble was threatening, he shot them. It is unfortunate that he did it with his own hand.

Thus the city of the Moguls was captured. 6,000 men had stormed and captured a great city defended by 30,000 well trained and desperate men, but at terrible cost. Nicholson was killed, and many another gallant soldier, the total loss

during the three months' siege being 992 killed and 2,845 wounded. Some of the actual regimental casualties were very severe. The 60th began with 440 men and received reinforcements of 200, their casualties were 389. The Gurkhas lost 319 from a total of 540. The Artillery lost 365 out of a total of 1,600. The effective strength of the troops at Delhi on the 11th September was 7,794; by the 20th they had lost 1,674 or 21.5 per cent.

Directly Delhi fell Wilson decided to despatch troops to march through the Doab to Cawnpore. For this purpose he detached a column under Colonel Greathed consisting of—

9th Lancers	300 men
Two Troops Horse Artillery	10 guns
One Battery Field Artillery	6 guns
8th and 75th Regiments	450 men
Detachments of Native Cavalry and Hodson's Horse	400 men
1st and 4th Punjab Infantry	1,200 men

In all some 950 Europeans, 1,850 Natives and 16 guns.

The column was to clear the Doab and then march to join Sir Colin Campbell.

On the 24th September the column marched and camped that night at Ghazi-ud-din Nagar. They found the land laid waste in all directions by the mutineers, an interesting testimony to the general native feeling towards the rebels.

On the morning of the 29th the column encountered a party of the enemy who had occupied a position near Bulandshahr. A scrambling action

ensued in the course of which Bouchier's Battery charged the enemy's guns at a gallop. There was some sharp hand-to-hand fighting. Next day a fort at Malagarh * was destroyed.

On the 5th October Aligarh was reached. Here piteous messages from Agra reached Greathed and he decided to march thither. The Infantry were conveyed on elephants, camels, bullock carts, etc., and on the 10th they reached Agra, the enemy having retreated.

The Agra authorities assured Greathed that no rebels were in the neighbourhood, and, trusting their statements, he took no precautions. That afternoon while the camp was full of visitors the enemy's guns opened fire on it. At first there was a scene of terrible confusion, but quickly falling in the troops moved against the rebels who were now located. The guns came into action and the infantry advanced; a party of rebel horsemen who tried to get into the camp were driven off by the 9th Lancers, who then charged the enemy's left flank. This charge and the advance of the infantry broke the enemy, and the troops pressing on occupied the rebel camp; the enemy completely dispersed.

The column halted three days, and started again on the 14th. On the 16th Hope Grant joined it and took command. On the 21st the Column was at Bewar; on the 23rd it had a skirmish at Kanouj, and on the 26th reached Cawnpore.

* Not marked on map.

CHAPTER VI.

Siege of the Residency of Lucknow—Outram and Havelock force their way through Lucknow to the Residency.

It was on June 30th that Sir Henry Lawrence with his handful of men had been driven to retire within his prepared position in Lucknow.

On July 1st the rebels attacked the British but were driven off. It was however clear that the Machi Bawan, the large building just outside the Residency enclosure could not be held. It was therefore abandoned and blown up.

The Residency entrenchments enclosed a space of near 60 acres, and consisted of a number of well-built houses and buildings of various sorts connected by trenches and stockades. The whole occupied a slight eminence which gave a certain command over the town. Unfortunately time had not permitted the destruction of a number of houses within rifle shot of the defences, which proved valuable points of vantage for the rebel riflemen.

The garrison consisted of—

British 1008 (of whom 153 were civilian volunteers),

Natives 712 (of these 230 deserted during the siege).

The non-combatants in the place were 1280, of whom about 600 were British and Eurasian women and children.

The garrison was amply supplied with ammunition and provisions. The provisions had been obtained chiefly by the Civil Authorities, and Sir Henry Lawrence had himself procured large quantities of grain. Owing perhaps to the ever-standing official differences between military and civil officers, no proper inventory of the stock of provisions was taken after Lawrence's death, until Sir James Outram arrived.

This fact is interesting and instructive, particularly to those who have served in our Crown Colonies and dependencies, and seen something of this curious phase of English official life, the consequence being that the garrison was unnecessarily put on half-rations about 15th August.

The garrison was detailed to various posts, which were each provided with a garrison commensurate with the numbers available; these posts were held throughout the siege. Naturally as time went on the defence works became stronger and stronger; on the other hand, the numbers of the defenders steadily diminished.

It is quite impossible in such a work as this to give a detailed account of this memorable siege. Day and night the whole place was searched by shot and shell. Daily some of the defenders were killed, some of the sick died.

On the second day of the siege Sir Henry Lawrence was struck by a round shot while in his bed and mortally wounded. The command then devolved on Major Banks, Acting Chief Commissioner. He was killed on July 21st, and then the command was assumed by Colonel T. E.

W. Inglis, 32nd Regiment, who commanded the troops.

On July 7th a sortie was made and a number of rebels killed.

On July 20th the enemy, having erected batteries, attempted an assault, but were driven back with fearful carnage, and the same day news of Havelock's first advance was received, and soon after the news of his failure.

After this the enemy attempted mining, but the 32nd were a Cornish Regiment and eight miners were found among them, Sergeant Day and Privates Hunter, Abel, Cummerford, Bonatta, Kitchen, Cullemore, and Farran. These men, under Captain Fulton, R.E., superintended the counter-mining parties.

The 7th of August is noted as the first day on which the besieged had no casualty.

The 10th August, another general assault was delivered, a breach being effected by a mine sprung near the Martinieri House. Some of the enemy got into the ditch; they were driven out by hand grenades. The enemy's loss was most severe.

On the 12th a sally was made; some of the enemy's trenches were destroyed.

On the 17th another successful sortie was made.

5th September another general assault was delivered and repulsed, the enemy's mines failed to effect a breach.

On the 23rd September distant cannonading was heard and hopes again rose, for the garrison

were beginning to doubt the reports brought in by the gallant and faithful native messenger Ungud, who carried letters to and fro several times, that Havelock was at last approaching.

On the 25th the enemy were seen to be retiring, and the peculiar crack of the Enfield Rifle was heard near by. Shortly after this Outram and Havelock arrived, and the 87 days' siege ended.

The story of the defence of Lucknow is one that will always stir the hearts of British men and women. The Residency was no fortress, merely an entrenched camp defended by a handful of British and a few Natives, without whose aid it is doubtful if the defence would have succeeded. The total fighting strength left at the end of the siege was 982. Thus the casualties had been over 30 per cent. A large number of women and children were killed or died.

It is now necessary to turn back to Cawnpore, and take up the story from the point at which Havelock and Outram were collected ready for an advance. Their force consisted of 6 weak European Regiments, Brasyer's Sikhs, about 60 Cavalry, and 25 guns.

On the night of 18th—19th September a floating bridge was laid over the Ganges and Havelock's advanced force crossed. On the 19th under cover of Eyre's battery the remainder of the column and baggage column passed the river. On the 20th the rearguard and Eyre's guns crossed over. On the 21st September in a deluge of rain the advance commenced.

Close to Mangalwar the enemy were found posted across the road, the right in a village, the centre and left covered by breastworks and a battery of six guns, from which fire was opened on the British Artillery as it advanced for action. One of the British gun elephants was wounded and caused much confusion; however, a line of guns soon confronted the rebel position. The 90th were sent to turn the rebel right, and then a general advance drove the enemy back; they were followed by the Volunteer Cavalry, among whom Outram plying his stout Malacca cane was foremost, and driven in headlong rout through Mangalwar with a loss of 120 killed and two guns.

Next day the advance was resumed and the bridge over the Sye River found intact. The force halted at Banni.

At 8.0 a.m. on the 23rd the advance was resumed, the road leading through a swamp, which at this season was a great sheet of water.

About 2.0 p.m. the Cavalry located the enemy. The position they occupied was strong. It was near 2 miles long, the right rested on some hillocks, the centre occupied a slight swell of ground, and the left held the great walled enclosure called the Alambagh. This position was occupied by nearly 10,000 trained Sepoys and 30 guns in addition to a number of adherents to the mutineer cause, formed in regiments called Nujibs.

Havelock pursued his favourite method of attack, the 1st Brigade and guns were to attack in front, the 2nd Brigade with the Cavalry and

Olphert's Battery was to turn the enemy's left. As the column advanced, being confined to the road, some loss was suffered by the gun fire of the rebels; however, at last an area of dry ground whereon the troops could deploy was reached. The 1st Brigade, which was leading, halted to let the 2nd Brigade get forward and make its turning movement, Olphert's Battery galloped forward over terribly bad ground, and Eyre's heavy guns came into action. As soon as the guns were well in action a simultaneous advance of the two brigades drove the enemy back. The Alambagh was then stormed, and the Cavalry and Olpherts guns pursued the enemy almost to the Char Bagh Bridge. That night news of the capture of Delhi was received in camp.

September the 24th the force halted, but the day was not without incident, for the baggage was attacked by rebel horsemen, who were driven off. The enemy then "sniped" the camp with two 9pr. guns concealed in a wood.

Havelock had intended to move from the Alambagh to the Dilkusha Palace and thence bridge the Gumti and gain the Faizabad-Lucknow road. With this object canal boats had been brought up from Cawnpore for use as pontoons. Reconnaissances, however, showed that the rain had rendered the route impracticable for artillery. To advance through the city was impossible. The route selected therefore was by the Char Bagh Bridge and the left bank of the canal. This meant that the force must first seize the Char Bagh Bridge, then turn to the right and circle

round the city. The sick and wounded were left in the Alambagh with 300 of the 78th as escort.

At 8.0 a.m. on the 25th the advanced guard, two companies 5th Regiment and Maude's Battery led the advance and soon were in action. After a short pause the Infantry stormed the house which the Mutineers were holding and pressing on reached the canal bank. On the town side the enemy had erected a breastwork and 6-gun battery covering the Char Bagh Bridge. Two of Maude's guns came into action, the skirmishers of the Madras Europeans occupied the canal bank on the left of the road, and Outram in person went to the right with the 5th Fusileers to seize the walled garden there and thus enfilade the enemy's position. The fire on the gradually increasing number of the British was so severe that Neill ordered the bridge to be stormed, an action which was nobly performed by a few men of the Madras Europeans and of the 84th, led by Arnold and Tytler. Arnold and Tytler fell, but the men led by Captain Havelock and Corporal Jacques were not to be denied; Tytler picking himself up led the 90th to capture two guns that were so posted as to be able to take the column in reverse; they were captured and brought off in triumph by Olpherts, who led up some spare limbers.

The column now pushed on, the rest of the 78th being left to hold the bridge. Some companies of the 90th formed the baggage guard. The enemy hotly pressed the 78th, who finally took the offensive.

Meanwhile the main column pressed on and was unmolested till it reached the Kaisar Bagh. The 78th having lost touch, had pushed up other streets and arrived at the Kaisar Bagh; here they opportunely stormed the battery which was firing on the main column. After another short delay the 78th and Sikhs pushed on again and reached the Residency Bailey Guard, but by this time night had fallen. The baggage with only about 100 men of the 90th, wedged in the narrow street, was in a precarious position. Next day the baggage guard was reinforced by Colonel Napier with various detachments. On the night 26th—27th the baggage and ammunition was brought up, and the main body pushed on to the grounds of the Chatar Manzil. The Residency was now entered, but it was found impossible to capture the Iron Bridge. Unfortunately, some of the hospital dhoolies lost their way in the town and the majority of the wounded who were in them were massacred. One party of wounded men and some of the escort however took refuge in a house and held out till relieved.

The losses were very heavy; 1,050 during the movement from the Alambagh to the Residency. General Neill and Colonel Campbell of the 90th and other well-known officers were killed. Once the town was entered the fighting was downright bludgeon work, skilful generalship was not so much required as prompt initiative by subordinate officers, N.C.O.'s, and even private soldiers. Colonel Napier's reconnaissances throughout the operations were most thorough, and the various narratives show that the success was largely due

to careful and thorough arrangements. It was an unfortunate necessity that forced Havelock to advance through the streets.

On arriving in Lucknow Outram assumed command. He saw that it was necessary for him to stop in Lucknow, for he could not cut his way out encumbered with the women and children, and other non-combatants. However, supplies were found to be more plentiful than had been supposed, and a few sorties cleared the houses near the entrenchment, which were then blown up.

The investment continued so close that communication could not be kept up with the Alam-bagh. The detachment of the 78th held out there however, and on the 7th October it was reinforced by 250 men of the 64th and two guns with plenty of stores.

CHAPTER VII.

Sir Colin Campbell Relieves Lucknow.

Sir Colin Campbell left Calcutta on the night of the 27th October and arrived at Cawnpore on the 3rd November.

While Sir Colin was on his way up country a force under Colonel Powell consisting of 403 Europeans and two 9pr. guns attacked a considerable force of the Mutineers at Khujwa south of Allahabad and routed them after a sharp action, chiefly noticeable for the fact that the success was due to the bayonet charge of the British, not to skilful dispositions.

The question which now confronted Sir Colin was whether he should move against the Gwalior troops, who were at Kalpi with the Nana and a large body of men under Tantia Topi, or to the relief of Lucknow. In an ordinary war the first was the obvious course, for the dispersal of the Kalpi force would secure the base. Sir Colin, however, considered that the immediate relief of Lucknow was essential, and it is clear that he was right.

On the 6th November orders were issued that General Windham, with 500 British and 550 Madras Infantry and gunners, was to hold Cawnpore, while the main body under Sir Colin was to advance to Lucknow to withdraw the garrison. The force for this expedition and a month's supplies were collected at Buntira; communication was opened by a Mr. Kavanagh, who, dis-

guised as a native, succeeded in getting through from the Residency.

On the 12th Sir Colin was able to move, and he opened communication with the troops in the Alambagh.

The total force now available was only some 4,700 men fit for service, distributed as follows:—

In command of the Troops—Hope Grant.

Naval Brigade—Peel.

250 men with 8 guns and 2 rocket tubes.

Artillery Brigade—Crawford.

One Battery R.H.A.

Three Troops Bengal Horse Artillery.

One Battery Bengal Field Artillery.

Two Companies R.A. with 18prs.

Cavalry Brigade—Little.

Two Squadrons, 9th Lancers.

Three Squadrons, Punjab Cavalry.

Hodson's Horse.

1st Infantry Brigade—Greathed.

Part 8th Regiment.

1st Battalion of detachments.

2nd Panjab Infantry.

2nd Infantry Brigade—Adrian Hope.

93rd Regiment.

Wing of the 53rd Regiment.

2nd Battalion of detachments.

3rd Infantry Brigade—Russell.

23rd Regiment.

Part 82nd Regiment.

Engineers.

One Company R.E.

Three Companies Natives.

As the total effective of this force was only 4,700 it will be seen how weak the battalions were.

On the 12th the force advanced and was soon in touch with the rebels. As the enemy's fire opened Bouchiers guns went into action and Gough with Hodson's Horse circled right round the enemy's left. His movement was concealed by trees, and a large body of the rebels was completely surprised, their camp captured and a number killed. That night the force halted close to the Alambagh.

The 75th were left in the Alambagh and their place in the column taken by the detachments in garrison there.

Sir Colin was determined not to repeat Havelock's movement through the streets. The plan adopted was to march round the city by the east, occupying successively the Dilkusha Park, the Martinière, and the line of the canal, then with the right secured by the Gumti River to mask the Kaiser Bagh, and under cover of the troops performing this duty to bring away the occupants of the Residency. The main body advanced between the Alambagh and the Jellalabad fort, which had been seized the day before, with Greathed's infantry and some guns deployed as a left flank guard. It was not till the Dilkusha Park wall was reached that the column was fired on. The Dilkusha was quickly occupied, and 13 guns were brought into action against the enemy in the Martinière. The infantry then

advanced and cleared this building with the bayonet. The cavalry pursued the rebels as they fell back.

Adrian Hope's Brigade, with a Field Battery and two 24prs., was placed on the canal side of the wood of the Martinière; Little, with the Cavalry and the 17th Battery, occupied the plain in front of the Martinière; and Russell's Brigade was placed in front of the Dilkusha, and occupied two villages close to the canal.

While the stores and ammunition were being brought up, several successive attacks were made by the rebels against the left and the baggage, but were repulsed. The 93rd, guarding the convoy, had a very rough time and it was morning of the 15th before all was up and stored in the Dilkusha, where the 8th Regiment was left with half the cavalry and a battery.

In order to draw the enemy's attention to his right flank a demonstration was made by the left wing, and the mortars kept up a steady bombardment on the Begum's Palace and the barracks on this day. Meanwhile Sir Colin, by a personal reconnaissance, satisfied himself that the ground on his right was practicable. During the night 15th—16th a further supply of small arm ammunition was brought up from the Alambagh by Lieut. Roberts, who had a most difficult task to accomplish.

On the 16th at 8.0 a.m. an advanced guard, consisting of a squadron Hodson's Horse, a troop of Horse Artillery, and a company 53rd Regiment, led the way, Hope's and Russell's Brigades followed, then the ammunition and Engineer

Parks, and Greathed brought up the rear. The column moving in echelon with the right in front crossed the canal and turned to the left, and soon were under fire from the houses. The lane along which the troops were moving was narrow and here the cavalry were in the way; some confusion occurred before they were got clear. Meantime the battery had come into action in a particularly difficult situation.

The fire was chiefly from the Sikandar Bagh and Kaiser Bagh, both of which places were strongly held. More guns came up, the houses of Sultanganj were cleared by the 93rd, a small hole was knocked in the wall of the Sikandar Bagh and through it the stormers of the 53rd, 93rd, and Brasyers Sikhs rushed. The gate was soon opened and a grisly massacre of the Sepoys inside the building took place. Quarter was neither asked nor given, and it is said that 2,000 of the rebels were left there dead.

After re-forming, the head of the column pushed on until it was brought up by the massive Shah Najaf Mosque. The building was of massive masonry and to breach it Peel laid his guns alongside the wall as if he were going into action against an enemy's frigate. An attempt to storm the place failed, but fortunately a hole was discovered by a Sergeant Paton of the 93rd, the stormers pushed in, and the Mosque was captured. Meanwhile Outram had not been idle. As soon as Sir Colin's troops reached the Sikandar Bagh the garrison attacked the Hirun Khana. At 3.15 the breaches in this building were practicable and the place was stormed.

On the evening of the 16th then only the Mess House and the Moti Mahal intervened between the two forces. This space was however dominated by the guns in the Kaisar Bagh.

On the 17th Russell's Brigade remained near Banks House to hold the left and left rear, the Mess House and Moti Mahal were battered by the Artillery and stormed by the 90th. Thus communication between the two forces was fully established.

The most difficult part of the task still remained—that of withdrawing the garrison and the occupants of the Residency.

Russell at Banks House still covered the left, and on the 18th some guns were successfully taken there, and some buildings from which a galling fire was kept up on the left rear were occupied, but had to be again evacuated. Up to this time Sir Colin had hoped to use the Trunk Road for his retirement, but as the enemy was so strong on the left he was obliged to abandon his intention.

On the 19th reconnaissances discovered some rough tracks that would serve the purpose, the garrison retiring by the same lane that the column had used in the advance. About noon of this day the withdrawal commenced, and during the night the women and children were brought out, and all safely reached the Sikandar Bagh.

On the 20th, under cover of Peel's heavy guns, the rest of the property in the Residency was removed. As a feint, preparations were made to assault the Kaisar Bagh, which was by now breached.

At midnight on the 21st Outram and the rearguard left the Residency, which had been prepared for destruction. Inglis was the last man to leave. After this each advanced post retired through its supports. Then Hope's Brigade withdrew, then Peel's guns, last of all the rearguard with the Chief in person. Shortly before dawn the whole force was safely in the Dilkusha, every man at his allotted post.

The Staff work was absolutely perfect, and as a model of a skilful withdrawal of a small force much encumbered with baggage, along a most difficult route in the face of a tenfold superior enemy, this achievement stands almost unique.

On the 24th of November Sir Henry Havelock died. "Never was a man more widely mourned or more honoured in his death."

On the 24th Hope Grant was moved to the Alambagh and Outram left at the Dilkusha. The women and children followed Grant, and Outram closed up on the 25th.

On the 26th Sir Colin issued orders for Outram with—

The Volunteer Cavalry,
Irregular Cavalry,
Punjab Cavalry,
Four Batteries,
Some Engineers,
5th, 75th, 78th, 84th, 90th, and 1st Bengal
Europeans,

in all some 4,000 men and 22 guns, to remain near the Alambagh and watch the rebels in Lucknow.

Hope Grant with the rest of the troops was to escort the convoy to Cawnpore.

It has been questioned whether Sir Colin was right in giving up Lucknow and establishing a force outside it with a view to holding it in check. Outram, who was the chief political officer, and Sir Colin were at variance on this point, for Outram wished to hold the Residency. On military grounds however it seems clear that Sir Colin was right and Outram wrong. A force tied up in the Residency was only a target for the enemy and could not effect any valuable military purpose, whereas a mobile force outside could co-operate usefully with the rest of the Field Army. Lucknow was purely of political importance, it contained no magazines or arsenal, and covered no important junction of road, rail or river.

CHAPTER VIII.

“ Redan ” Windham at Cawnpore—His situation—He moves out against the rebels—He is forced to retreat into his entrenchment—Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell—Tantia Topi defeated and pursued.

To secure his base, the bridge, and the great accumulation of stores on the right bank of the Ganges at Cawnpore, Sir Colin Campbell had left “ Redan ” Windham with a wing of the 64th, a few sailors, parties of various corps, for the most part men left to look after the baggage of their regiments, about 500 natives, and four light guns. In all some 1,000 men, of whom 500 were British and 500 natives, but there were no Cavalry. Windham’s orders were to watch the large force of mutineers at Kalpi, to hold the entrenchment if attacked, and to forward all available men to the main force as they arrived, for the rear detachments of the corps with Sir Colin had by no means all come in when he started. On the 12th November his spies reported to Windham that the mutineers were crossing the Jumna. Windham applied for and obtained permission to retain the detachments as they came up. Even after this, however, he twice forwarded large drafts to Sir Colin. Gradually his force began to increase and by the 25th it consisted of some 1,700 men and 14 guns, consisting of detachments of the 34th, Rifle Brigade, 64th, 82nd, and 88th Regiments, the 27th Madras N. Infantry, and 14 guns.

In order to watch the mutineers Windham had left a garrison of the 64th Regiment in the entrenchment, and encamped himself at the junction of the Kalpi and Grand Trunk Roads.

On the 17th November he heard that the advanced troops of the rebels held two villages about 15 miles from Cawnpore, on either bank of the Ganges Canal. He proposed to Sir Colin to move up the canal by boat and surprise one or both of these posts, an action which would have the effect of upsetting the rebel plans and probably breaking up their force.

However on the 19th a body of rebels surprised the post at Banni. The 27th Madras N.I. was at once sent to clear the road and Windham abandoned his plan.

Still considering that the best way to guard Cawnpore was to meet Tantia Topi and his mutinous regiments in the open field, on the 24th Windham, still leaving the 64th in the entrenchment, moved out down the Kalpi Road about six miles; his force was about 1,000 men, consisting of the 34th and detachments of the Rifle Brigade, the 82nd and the 88th, and eight guns.

Tantia Topi had decided to take the offensive and moved forward on this same day. On the 25th the rebel advanced guard occupied a position on the Pandu Naddi, and the main body closed up in the afternoon; it consisted of some 25,000 men with 50 guns.

On the morning of the 26th Windham boldly attacked the rebels on the Pandu Naddi. The

nullah was crossed, the rebel advanced guard driven back and 3 guns captured, but no pursuit was possible without mounted men. The main body of the rebels closed up and the British were obliged to withdraw, which they did with some difficulty. Windham encamped again that night at his old camp at the junction of the Kalpi and Delhi roads. Windham's situation was now critical for he had a great town between himself and his supports, while 25,000 rebels flushed with success confronted his bare 1,000.

At 10 a.m. on the 27th the rebels commenced their attack advancing along the Kalpi and Bithor roads. Carthew with the 34th was sent to the Bithor Road, Walpole with the Rifle Brigade, the 88th and the guns, held the Kalpi Road, the 82nd stood in the interval posted in a clump of trees. Carthew by vigorous and skilful dispositions checked and even drove back the rebels along the Bithor Road, but the main attack, supported by heavy artillery, continued to be pressed against the front, and the rebels extending to their right encircled the British left. The British then fell back to the brick kilns, the 82nd was posted in some buildings to cover the right and protect the withdrawal; at the same time, most unfortunately, Windham called in Carthew and the 34th. The enemy at once entered the lower part of the town and attacked the entrenchment itself, while the detachment of the 82nd, for some unexplained reason, left its position and fell back.

At this juncture "Redan" Windham justified his soubriquet. A detachment of the Rifle Brigade

coming up the Grand Trunk Road from Allahabad had opportunely arrived. Placing himself at their head Windham cleared the upper town with the bayonet; returning to the main battle, he sent Carthew with the 34th and Chamier's battery to open up the right again. This work was splendidly performed, and the rest of the troops were able to get back to the entrenchment, though in great confusion and without their camp equipage.

On the 28th the rebels renewed their attack against Windham's position. In addition to the entrenchment Windham still held the main portion of the town. Carthew was placed on the Bithor Road, Walpole on the Kalpi Road. Both assumed the offensive, and both were successful, but the enemy's numbers were so great that gradually Carthew found his left in great danger. He was obliged to fall back a little and at night-fall retreated to the entrenchment. This movement allowed the large stores accumulated at the assembly rooms to fall into the hands of the mutineers, and endangered the safety of the bridge of boats.

For this action the blame was at first laid upon Carthew. It seems, however, that the night before, when discussing matters with his subordinate leaders Windham had used the following words: "Well, gentlemen, when we can hold out no longer we must retire to the entrenchment." Carthew was therefore exonerated from blame, but the incident is instructive of the necessity for preciseness in the giving of directions.

While the action was in progress Sir Colin Campbell's column was approaching, and at every

step the roar of the distant cannonade became clearer. Ordering Hope Grant to take command and halt with the Infantry and Field Artillery at Mangalwar, the chief himself pushed on with the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. He and his staff out-distancing the troops, were the first to reach the boat bridge, where it is recorded that the subaltern of the piquet expressed his delight at seeing them in effusive terms and ended, "We are at our last gasp." Colin Campbell had a bitter tongue when roused, and to suggest that British soldiers could ever be at their last gasp was like a red rag to a bull for him. The subaltern was "sorry he spoke."

During the night 28th—29th the main column moved forward and careful arrangements were made to cover its passage of the river on the 29th. Inglis had the rearguard. Hope Grant pushed on and occupied the level space between the entrenchment and the city. The rebels kept up a steady fire on the British camp.

General Windham's conduct of this affair was certainly not a masterpiece. On the 17th he asked leave to attack an advanced detachment of the rebels, yet on the 25th on his own initiative he moved out to attack their whole force.

Without cavalry he could not hope to inflict a crushing defeat on the rebels and his orders were only to safeguard Cawnpore.

No doubt a vigorous offensive is the best defensive, particularly against Asiatics, but there is a reasonable limit to its value. For 1,200 men without cavalry and weak in artillery to attack 25,000

well provided with both was to court a failure, and in the Mutiny failure and defeat were synonymous terms. It is much to be feared that unconsciously General Windham's eye was not solely bent upon the strategical purposes of his chief, but also looked for chances of personal distinction.

On the 3rd December, arrangements having at last been completed, the convoy of women, children, sick and wounded left for Allahabad.

The rebels who had been suffered during this period to remain with impunity in the neighbourhood and make occasional attacks on the camp, had collected in even larger force than previously. They had occupied a position which was certainly strong. Their left rested on the Ganges and their centre on the town, covered by the canal; their right, with Tantia Topi in person with the Gwalior and Central India Mutineers, was stretched out to Jooi occupying a number of mounds of rubble, the brick-kilns, etc. The front was covered by the canal, but the right was in the air.

Sir Colin's available force was about—

600 Cavalry,
5,000 Infantry,
36 Guns.

His plan was simple. He would threaten the rebel left and centre, break their right, and while the cavalry pursued it, swing round his left to force the enemy to evacuate the town.

Windham was to hold the entrenchment. Greathed and Walpole with four battalions and

a battery were to threaten the centre, Hope and Inglis were to cross the canal and reach the Kalpi road. The cavalry under Little were to make a wide detour to fall on the enemy as he retreated towards Kalpi. To draw the enemy's attention to his left Windham was to open the ball by a cannonade from the entrenchment.

On December 4th at 9 a.m. Windham's guns opened. At 11.0 Walpole advanced and rushed the bridge west of Generalganj. The guns of Peel's, Longden's, Bouchier's and Middleton's batteries came into action against the kilns and mounds in front of the enemy's right. Under cover of this fire Hope and Inglis took ground to the left and wheeling to the right formed in three lines. The Sikhs and 53rd covered the front. Hope followed and then Inglis. The Sikhs and 58rd forcing the enemy back from point to point reached the canal, but found the bridge protected by a great battery, and it seemed for a moment as if the advance would be checked, but Peel's sailors brought up a 24pr. at a double, trundling it along as if it were a toy, and planted it on the bridge, so inspiring the British and surprising the rebels that the whole force dashed forward, forded the canal, and stormed over the rebel position, and pressing rapidly forward occupied the camp of the rebels who fled in confusion. Bouchier's guns, attended by Sir Colin's and Hope Grant's staff as escort, pursued the flying rebels, for the cavalry had missed their way. At last the latter arrived and spreading out pursued the enemy for 14 miles, the pursuit looking very like a fox hunt. Nineteen guns were taken and many men killed.

Bouchier's exploit is only one among the many wonderful performances of the Horse Artillery in the Mutiny. It will be recalled that Stonewall Jackson pursued Banks from Winchester with mounted gunners; perhaps he might have done better had he taken the guns themselves, like Sir Colin Campbell did.

While the pursuit of the Gwalior Troops along the Kalpi road was being thus pressed, Mansfield with Walpole's Brigade, part of Adrian Hope's Brigade, and two batteries proceeded to attack in the direction of the Civil Station, and thereby endanger the line of retreat of the left and centre of the rebel line, which was principally held by Nujib troops and retainers of the Talukdars. Mansfield pushed back the enemy, but not wishing to commit his men in the town itself, he halted for the night in his position. During the night the rebel centre and left fled as was to be expected. Not being minded to let this body safely escape, Sir Colin despatched Hope Grant after them with 750 cavalry, 2,000 infantry and 11 guns. Hope Grant found them at Serai Ghat on the 10th, endeavouring to embark their fifteen guns. The Artillery came into action and the rebels fled after attempting a cavalry attack, the whole of the 15 guns were captured, making a total of 34 out of Tantia Topi's total of 50.

This engagement is a fine example of Sir Colin Campbell's combination of forethought and audacity. The plan arranged was simple in the extreme, yet it was undoubtedly most daring, for his small force was considerably dispersed at one

period. Mansfield's refusal to press the attack against the town has been hotly criticized. An impartial judgment must admit that it would have resulted in heavy losses and would probably at that late hour have gained but scanty success, for the cavalry were away towards Kalpi, and they alone could reap the fruits of victory.

CHAPTER IX.

Operations in the Doab—The Nepalese—Jung Bahadur's Army—Frank's Division—Rowcroft's Column.

Greathed's Column from the Delhi Field Force had it is true passed through the Doab, but it was necessary to clear the country of rebels. Delhi, Allahabad, Cawnpore and Agra were now held by the British. Sir Hugh Rose was preparing to clear Central India.

For the pacification of the Doab Sir Colin decided to move by converging columns on Fatehgarh.

A force from Delhi was to march by the upper Doab and meet a column from Cawnpore at Mainpuri, thence both columns were to move on Fatehgarh, while he himself moved direct thither from Cawnpore.

On the 11th December Colonel Seaton with a column of 1,900 men and 5 guns moved off from Delhi with a convoy. Hearing of a body of rebels near Aligarh he proceeded thither by forced marches, left the convoy in the fort there, and on the 14th December caught the enemy near Kasganj. A smart cavalry charge captured three guns. The enemy fled along the Fatehgarh Road and were caught up on the 17th at Patiali. Though entrenched and in considerable strength, they fled at the threat of attack. The Cavalry and Horse Artillery charged in line together. All the enemy's guns were taken.

Seaton now returned to Aligarh and took the convoy to Mainpuri, where he again had an encounter with a rebel band, which was dispersed.

On the 18th December a column under Walpole left Cawnpore to sweep the Lower Doab and encountering little opposition joined Seaton near Mainpuri on the 3rd January, 1858.

Sir Colin had to wait for his transport to return from Allahabad. This it did on the 23rd, and on the 24th he also marched, Hope Grant with a column making a detour to Bithor and Windham to destroy a rebel fort. The boats and ferries over the Ganges were destroyed.

On the 30th despatches from Seaton reached Sir Colin brought to him after a most adventurous ride by Hodson and Macdowell.

On the 1st January, 1858, Sir Colin was re-joined by the detachments referred to above. Hearing that a body of rebels under the Nawab of Farakabad was at Khudaganj and was destroying the bridge over the Kali Nadi, Adrian Hope was despatched to hold it. The bridge was found partially destroyed.

On the 2nd Hope was attacked; Hope Grant was pushed on in support, the main body following. The rebel position at Khudaganj on the crest of a slight slope completely dominated the bridge, and the passage was both dangerous and slow; at last however the rebels' guns were silenced by the Naval Brigade. The 53rd had meanwhile covered the front and it was arranged that the 93rd Highlanders should pass through them to take the village, while Greathed's Brigade turned the rebel right.

The 53rd however were not minded to allow Highlanders or anyone else to show them the way. The men forced a bugler boy to sound the charge, and dashing forward soon cleared the village. Hope Grant seized the chance, moving his squadrons to the left, sheltered from view by the ground, he caught up the rebels, charged and broke them, pursuing for 5 miles until daylight failed. It was for two incidents in this pursuit, the saving of a sowars' life, and the capture single-handed of a standard, that Lord Roberts gained his V.C.

It is related that Sir Colin was furious with the 53rd for their breach of discipline, and having had them formed up rode up with the intention of rating them soundly. But the 53rd were not to be defeated, every time the chief opened his mouth they gave "Three cheers for Sir Colin," and shouted with all their might, until finally Sir Colin rode off laughing. Is it necessary to remark that the bulk of the men of the 53rd were Irish?

On the 3rd the Column reached Fatehgarh and were joined there on the 6th by Windham and Seaton. The Doab was now sufficiently cleared for the police officers to resume their functions.

Reverting now to operations in Behar, we have seen that in July a force of 3,000 Gurkhas was assembled at Juanpur, where their presence kept the district in order.

In September a body of rebels from Oudh threatened Azamgarh. 1,200 men under Capt. Boileau, the bulk of whose force was formed by a Gurkha regiment commanded by Shumshere Sing, marched 50 miles in 36 hours, reaching

Azamgarh on the 19th September. On the 20th the rebels were attacked near Mandori. The Gurkhas stormed the rebel position. A party of Volunteer Horse under Mr. Venables rendered good service in the pursuit.

Late in October the rebels made head again, and a force of 1,100 Gurkhas caught and beat 5,000 of them with 5 guns at Chanda, after a stubborn engagement on the 31st October.

Early in November the Juanpur force was increased by 320 men of the 10th Regiment, two 9prs., and 170 of the Madras Infantry, under command of Colonel Longden. On the 4th November a body of rebels again crossing from Oudh was attacked by the united force and driven back.

The Juanpur force was about this time formed into a brigade under General Franks. At the same time a force of British and Gurkha troops was formed under Colonel Rowcroft at Tirhut, and cleared the Gandak River Valley.

Lord Canning now invited Jung Bahadur, the Prime Minister of Nepal, to form an army of 10,000 men and 24 guns, to clear the districts north of Oudh, and to co-operate in the attack on Oudh. The request was at once complied with, and the force passed the frontier December 21st. On January 13th Jung Bahadur surprised a rebel force near Gorakhpur; after a brief artillery action the Gurkhas charged and pursued the enemy, inflicting terrible losses upon them. Jung Bahadur now moved steadily to the Gogra River, where Rowcroft with his small force approached him from Western Behar. Reinforced by a

Gurkha Regiment, Rowcroft attacked and defeated the rebels at Sohanpur,* the strong rebel position being skilfully turned by a movement round the enemy's left.

Moving by boat up the Gogra, Rowcroft joined Jung Bahadur and, reinforced by a Gurkha Brigade, attacked the rebels at Phirpur.*

A bridge of boats was then made there, and on the 19th February the Gurkhas crossed into Oudh. Jung Bahadur marched on Lucknow while Rowcroft occupied Gorakhpur.

At the same time that Jung Bahadur moved down from Nepal, General Franks who, as has been mentioned, had taken command of Longden's force, was gradually reinforced to the strength of a division. His force consisted of—

10th, 20th, and 97th Regiments,
Six Battalions of Gurkhas,
15 Guns,
65 Mounted Men.

A total strength of 5,700, of whom 3,200 were Gurkhas.

On the 22nd January an action was fought at Sikandra, and after that Franks halted at Singramao, until Rowcroft should reach Gorakhpur, when he at once advanced.

On the 19th February Franks met a division of the rebel Mehndee Hassan's Army at Chanda and routed it, pursuing all day. In the evening Mehndee Hassan himself came up with some 10,000 men, but was driven back. On the 20th Franks halted for the baggage.

* Not marked on map.

On this day Franks heard that the rebels proposed to occupy a defile guarded by the Fort of Budhayun. By skilful arrangements the rebels were deceived, and the fort seized in advance of them. Mehndee Hassan then retired to Sultanpur, his force amounting to some 25,000 men (of whom 5,000 were Sepoys), and 25 guns.

The rebel position was behind a deep nullah across the main road, with the left in Sultanpur, the right near the Serai of Badshahganj. Franks' dispositions for the attack were admirable. He marched straight down the main road as if to cross the nullah. He drove the enemy's outposts across the nullah and then personally reconnoitred for a passage on the right of the enemy. This he found. His force was to a great extent concealed by trees, and, moving off to his left, he outflanked the enemy's position.

There was a sharp action, in which Lieutenant McLeod Innes particularly distinguished himself. The enemy fled with a loss of 21 guns and their camp. Want of cavalry and bad ground prevented a pursuit.

That day the force was reinforced by the Lahore Light Horse, the Pathan Horse and a detachment of 3rd Sikh Cavalry.

On the 25th the column resumed its march.

On the 1st March Aikman with his Sikh Cavalry, by a dashing exploit, defeated 500 rebel infantry and 200 cavalry on the banks of the Gumti.

On the 4th March Franks arrived within eight miles of Lucknow, and attacked a fort called

Dhowra. A body of rebels, located in a massive well-built house, could not, however, be dislodged, even by the 24 pounders. The same evening the column reported to Sir Colin Campbell, who, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, had collected a great force outside Lucknow.

This march was of great value, for it cleared the way for Jung Bahadur and opened Upper Oudh. The districts of Behar and Chutia Nagpur remained, however, for many months in a state of partial anarchy. Kunwar Singh and his brothers held out in Behar, near Juanpur and Azamgarh, and bodies of disbanded soldiers in Chutia Nagpur made the main road dangerous.

In the middle of January Lord Canning came up from Calcutta to Allahabad, to the great advantage of the public service, for he was there free from his Council.

It is now necessary to return to the operations of Outram. He had 4,450 men, and his task was to watch a city with a population of three-quarters of a million, defended by 100,000 men and 120 guns, for into Lucknow had poured all the rebel strength. His position was undoubtedly weak and dangerous, and Outram favoured withdrawal, but was ordered to hold out. Some rather acrimonious correspondence took place between Outram and Sir Colin Campbell's Chief of the Staff, General Mansfield.

About the 21st the rebels sent a party to Guili to try and cut Outram's communications. On the 22nd this party was attacked and heavily defeated, the men of the military train specially distinguishing themselves.

On the 12th January a general attack was made on the position, but repulsed. On the 16th a second attack was made, and thereafter the enemy constantly harrassed the force. On the 15th February the enemy endeavoured to cut off a convoy. On the 16th a strong attack was made. On the 21st a severe attack by a force of about 20,000 men was repulsed, the cavalry distinguishing themselves in the engagement. On the 25th the rebels in great strength, accompanied by the Nana, came out to attack. Outram went out with the cavalry to meet them and drove them back with heavy losses. The attack was resumed in the evening, but easily repulsed. This was the last attack.

As a feat of arms the defence of the Alambagh lines for twelve weeks against so large an army as was that of the rebel has seldom been surpassed. It was in great measure due to Sir James Outram's personal qualities.

The rebels had collected the following troops at Lucknow to oppose Sir Colin Campell (vide State papers, edited by Mr. Forrest, Vol. IV., p. 454) :—

37	Regiments of Sepoys	27,550
14	„ new levies	5,400
106	„ Nujibs	55,150
26	„ Cavalry	7,100
	Camel Corps	300

Total 95,500

This does not include the armed retainers of the landowners of Oudh. The guns, exclusive of those mounted on the walls, amounted to 131.

We may, therefore, say that the Nana's army was about 120,000 strong with 120 guns.

Thousands of workmen were employed to strengthen the lines of defence, the centre of which was the Kaisar Bagh.

When Sir Colin had reached Fatehgarh, and had cleared the Doab, the question was, what to do next?

Sir Colin himself favoured the plan of clearing Rohilkhand, re-establishing order in Behar and Chutia Nagpur, awaiting Sir Hugh Rose's advance through Central India, and then with the whole united army to make a final attack on Lucknow to settle the matter.

Lord Canning, however, took a different view. While admitting that from a purely military point of view the situation very possibly would be best met by Sir Colin Campbell's plan, he nevertheless considered that the capture of Lucknow and the defeat of the great rebel army there was politically so important as to override the military advantages of the other method. Sir Colin gave way and prepared to attack Lucknow.

The Statesman, be he never so wise, who in the midst of war takes upon himself the responsibility of over-ruling, or rather over-persuading, the Commander of an Army accepts a responsibility of no mean weight. It is seldom indeed that his advice proves advantageous; in European war probably it would never be correct to so over-rule the strategical judgment of a Commander. But this war was in every particular peculiar. The enemy was a rebel, he had set up a King, there

was in fact "A King of Oudh seeking his own," to overthrow him struck at the heart of the rebellion, and after that, police measures, on a large scale it is true, but still police measures, would finish the work of pacification. Meanwhile the whole of India and the Central East had its eyes turned on Lucknow. There is no doubt that here we have an example of the political necessity being superior to the military exigencies.

All January every effort was strained to get up the siege train from Agra (170 miles), to collect troops near and at Cawnpore, to get up two great 64prs. from Allahabad and so on. The result was delay, for which the omniscient gentlemen of the press loudly blamed the chief. It is sad to have to relate that this stupid criticism was not confined to the press, but found voice in the Army also. Sir Colin, however, knew well that he knew more of war than his critics, and remained steadily at Fatehgarh, where he threatened Rohilkhand as well as Oudh. In the latter part of January a great show was made of crossing the Ganges into Oudh. Hope Grant attacked a rebel force at Shumshabad defeating it severely, the cavalry having a very sharp action with the rebel cavalry, who tried to cut off the guns. This action cleared the Doab again.

On the 1st February Sir Colin moved to Cawnpore. Hope Grant followed, leaving Walpole to hold Fategarh for a few days and then follow, leaving only a small garrison there under Seaton.

The troops were now collecting fast at Cawnpore, and were passed over the Ganges and

cantonned at Unao, Bashiratganj, Banni, etc., the intention being to assemble the whole army near Buntira. It was, however, necessary to wait for Franks and Jung Bahadur.

Meanwhile Hope Grant was sent on an expedition to take a small fort, where the Nana was supposed to be, but he had fled. On his way back Grant was opposed at Mianganj, and, after a sharp action, cleared the town of rebels, after which the cavalry rode them down.

On the 1st March Grant returned to Buntira.

All was now ready for the advance. Franks was rapidly approaching, Jung Bahadur was close behind him, there was no time to waste for already the hot weather was upon the land, so the final advance commenced.

CHAPTER X.

The Capture of Lucknow.

Many months had passed since Tantia Topi under the Nana's directions had carried out the massacre of Cawnpore. Delhi had fallen, the North-West provinces were again almost tranquil, Lucknow was relieved, and for four months Outram's weak division had been watching the force of the rebels gathering for the defence of their last stronghold.

To attack it Sir Colin Campbell had collected a force of rather more than 30,000 men and 164 guns, distributed as follows—

Cavalry Division.—Hope Grant.

1st Brigade.—9th Lancers	454
2nd Battalion Military Train	210
Wale's Horse (Sikhs)	466
2nd Punjab Cavalry	520
Detachments	160
2nd Brigade.—2nd Dragoon Guards	471
7th Hussars	422
Volunteer Cavalry	59
1st Punjab Cavalry	106
Hodson's Horse	743
Total	<hr/> 3,613 <hr/>

Artillery Division.—Wilson.

Naval Brigade	431
Field Artillery Brigade	800
Siege ,, ,,	382
Total	<u>1,613</u>

Engineer Brigade.—Napier.

Royal Engineers	217
Bengal Engineers	247
Punjab Pioneers	782
Delhi Pioneers (unarmed)	754
Total	<u>2,002</u>

1st Infantry (or Outram's Division).—Outram.

1st Brigade.—5th Regiment	534
84th ,,	665
1st Madras Europeans	498
2nd Brigade.—78th Regiment	519
90th ,,	736
Firuzpur Regiment	323
Total	<u>3,275</u>

2nd Infantry Division.—Lugard.

3rd Brigade.—34th Regiment	572
38th ,,	986
53rd ,,	811
4th Brigade.—42nd ,,	879
93rd ,,	936
4th Punjab Rifles	470
Total	<u>4,654</u>

3rd Infantry Division.—Walpole.

5th Brigade.—23rd Regiment	879
79th „	908
1st Bengal Europeans	576
6th Brigade.—2nd Battn. Rifle Brigade	793
3rd „ „ „	877
2nd Punjab Infantry	590
	<hr/>
	4,623
	<hr/>

Frank's Division.

Artillery.—Four Batteries	344
Cavalry.—Benares Horse	70
Lahore Light Horse	133
Pathan Horse	109
3rd Sikh Irregulars	216
	<hr/>
	872
	<hr/>

British Infantry.—10th Regiment	698
20th „	676
97th „	613
	<hr/>
	1,987
	<hr/>

This makes a total of 22,654 men and about 5,500 horses.

With Frank's Division were—

6 Battalions of Gurkha Infantry and Artillery	3,019
Jung Bahadur's Force about	6,000
	<hr/>
Approximate Total	9,000
	<hr/>

At the beginning of March the forces were distributed as follows:—

In the Alambagh Lines watching Lucknow, Outram's Division and a portion of the Cavalry.

In camps at Buntira and Mangalwar, remainder of the Cavalry, 1st and 2nd Division and the siege train.

Approaching from the east, Frank's Division followed by Jung Bahadur's Division.

For the defence of Lucknow the rebels had prepared formidable defences. The citadel and heart of the defence was the Kaisar Bagh, which was very carefully prepared for defence. To cover the approaches to the citadel from the south-east the rebels had prepared two main lines. One along the bank of the canal covering all the bridges and one in rear of it embracing the Moti Mahal, the Mess House, and the Little Imambara. To cover the approaches to the Kaiser Bagh from the north-east a line at right angles to the other two had also been prepared, and extended to the left to cover the passages of the stone and iron bridges. In addition to these lines the rebels had prepared every building on the probable lines of advance from the south-east and each for an obstinate defence.

“The buildings formed a range of massive palaces and walled courts, of vast extent, equalled perhaps, but certainly not surpassed, in any capital in Europe. Every outlet had been covered by a work, and on every side were prepared barricades, and loopholed parapets.” (See Colin Campbell's report).

Sir Colin Campbell directed Napier, the chief Engineer, to prepare a plan for the siege, and his plan was finally adopted by Sir Colin.

It was (1) To seize the Dilkusha Palace. Under cover of this position to pass a force round the city to attack from the north, and establish batteries enfilading the rebel lines.

(2) A methodical advance covered by the erection of siege batteries, and assisted by the careful sapping through of houses and buildings was then to take place. Thus the enemy would be driven out to the westward and then pursued by the great cavalry force at Sir Colin's disposal.

The right attack was entrusted to Outram, who was given Walpole's Division and Little's Cavalry Brigade (the 1st); Hope Grant accompanied Outram. Outram's own Division was broken up.

On the 2nd March the advanced troops
1,300 Cavalry,
3 Troops Horse Artillery,
4 Guns Naval Brigade,
2nd Infantry Division,

moved off, passed through the Alambagh lines, and occupied the Dilkusha after a skirmish. The Naval guns were placed just north-east of the Dilkusha on a slight eminence, and next day more guns were placed in the Park in battery.

During the night 4th to 5th, and during the 5th, bridges were thrown over the Gumti east of the Dilkusha House. An attempt on the 5th to interrupt the bridging operations was beaten off with loss.

During the night of the 5th—6th Outram passed the bridges and camped on the 6th half a mile west of Chinhat on the Faizabad road. A garrison (two regiments) was left at the Alam-bagh. The rest of the force camped near the Dilkusha.

On the 7th one of the cask bridges was moved to Bibipur. There the siege guns passed the river.

On the 8th and night 8th—9th batteries were erected for the attack of the Chaka Kothi by Outram's force and of the Martinière by the main attack.

On the 9th Outram stormed the Chaka Kothi; when Sir Colin saw that this operation had been successful he ordered the Martinière to be taken, an operation which was successfully carried out.

Outram then occupied the Badshah Bagh, and a battery was placed near Jagrauli to enfilade the enemy's first line along the canal.

These lines were, however, seen to be evacuated, and were promptly occupied by troops from the main attack, the men pushing along them until Banks House was reached. Here they were ordered to halt, as it was intended to breach Banks House before storming it.

During Outram's operations the right was covered by Hope Grant and the cavalry.

On the 10th Banks House was breached and taken, and first the Sikandar Bagh and then the Shah Majaf Mosque were occupied without opposition by troops of Lugard's Division. In the afternoon Adrian Hope with the 93rd and the 4th Punjab Infantry stormed the Begum Kothi. Here the rebels were penned in the buildings,

and, unable to escape, they fought it out with the bayonet. Over 600 of them were buried in the ditch next day.

On this day the Nipalese troops, who had marched in to camp, were posted to cover the left. Franks' Division formed in effect a general reserve on the Cawnpore road.

On the 12th and 13th Franks and Lugard changed places and the advance was continued by the Engineers under Napier who, breaking through or blowing up the houses, gradually approached the enemy's final positions round the Kaisar Bagh.

At 9 o'clock on the 14th Franks stormed the Little Imambarah, the ready and prompt initiation of certain subordinate officers carried the troops forward to a point close to the Kaisar Bagh.

Franks supported his subordinates with his usual energy, his right occupied the Moti Mahal, the Chatar Manzil, and the Tara Kothi, while his left dashed through Saadat Ali's Mosque and stormed the Kaisar Bagh. The resistance in this palace of the Kings of Oudh was fierce, but short, and the loot taken in the whole range of buildings of great value.

Meanwhile, Sir James Outram had not been idle. On the 11th he had camped close to the Gumti, and occupied the approaches to the iron bridge.

On the 14th, hearing of the storm of the Kaisar Bagh, he applied for permission to fulfil his role, by storming and seizing the bridges, and falling

on the enemy as they evacuated the city. He received a reply from General Mansfield, Sir Colin's Chief of the Staff, that he might cross the bridges "if it did not entail the loss of one single man."

Such an order is absolutely incomprehensible. It was explicit, and Sir James' hands were tied. It is manifest that had he stormed the bridges, and, gaining the open country, had despatched Sir Hope Grant in pursuit of the flying foe, the probable result would have been the complete disintegration of the rebel forces. As it was they retreated in fairly well-formed bodies, and, as the event proved, were still full of mischief.

On the 15th Hope Grant was despatched along the Sitapur, and Campbell with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade along the Sandila roads. They accomplished little.

On the 16th Outram passed the river with one brigade, and, pushing up the right bank, took the positions covering the bridges in reverse.

While this operation was in progress, a body of the mutineers attacked the remainder of Outram's division, who were on the left bank watching the iron bridge. Under cover of this attack about 20,000 of the rebels were able to get across the stone bridge and to get away up the Faizabad Road. Outram in the afternoon carried the Machi Bhawan and Great Imambarah.

On the same day a body of mutineers attacked the Alambagh, but were foiled and pursued by the Military Train and Olphert's battery.

During these two days Jung Bahadur had moved up on the extreme left, and had turned and taken all the enemy's positions on the south-west side of the town.

During the 17th further progress in clearing the town was made.

On the 18th Outram stormed the Musa Bagh. Sir Colin had ordered Campbell's Brigade to be prepared to pursue the rebels as they fell back, but Campbell lost his way or was otherwise diverted from his object, and the rebels escaped, except for such pursuit as the 9th Lancers could carry out. This regiment killed about 100 of them.

The leading spirit of the mutineers had throughout been the Moulvie of Faizabad. This determined man was still in Lucknow holding a block of houses in the centre of the city. Lugard expelled him on the 21st.

On the 23rd Sir Hope Grant caught up and dispersed a large body of rebels on the Faizabad road, capturing 13 guns.

With this action the siege of Lucknow ended. The British losses amounted to only 140 killed and 595 wounded. The smallness of the loss is certainly to be attributed to the methodical and careful plan of attack, which, except that the Kaiser Bagh was taken a day earlier than intended, was rigidly adhered to throughout. It is perhaps natural to attribute success to the originator of a successful plan rather than to the Commander-in-Chief. The credit for the successful capture of Lucknow is often attributed to Napier, because the plan he drew up was

adopted. It was a matter no doubt for great satisfaction to Colonel Napier that his plan was adopted, but the fact remains that it was carried out by Sir Colin Campbell, and to him and him alone is due the credit for the success. To him also must be attributed the blame for the failure of the pursuit.

On the 14th Outram was prevented from crossing the bridges. On the 15th a wrong direction was given to the Cavalry Brigades. When they were recalled, on the 17th, they were wrongly posted, for they should undoubtedly both have been placed under Hope Grant on the Lucknow bank of the Gumti. Sir Hugh Rose's distribution of his cavalry during his siege of Jhansi is interesting as a comparison. No doubt the success is partly to be attributed to the moral collapse of the rebels. Nevertheless, the capture by a force of 30,000 men of a great city held by 120,000 men, and that too with trivial loss to the attacker, was a marvellous feat of arms, and must stand as a model of careful preparation, patience, and opportune boldness.

“ A gallant soldier himself who was at his best in the press of battle, Sir Colin Campbell would never sacrifice his men in vain conflicts with hopeless obstacles.” Never was a better example of Moltke's “ Soldier's Motto,” “ Erst wegen dann wagen ”—First ponder then dare.

CHAPTER XI.

Sir Hugh Rose in Central India—Jhansi—
Kalpi—Whitlock in Bandalkhand—Banda.

In Chapter IV. the arrangements to quell the rebellion in Central India were detailed. A column based on Bombay would first deal with Jhansi, and then advance to Kalpi, while one from Madras, commanded by Whitlock, would advance from Jabalpur on Banda. The most dangerous opposition might be expected from the Rani of Jhansi and the Rajah of Banda.

Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, who had been appointed to the command of the Bombay column, landed in India in December, and on the 16th of that month took command of the troops at Mau. He was a man of a little over 50, distinguished both as a soldier and as a diplomatist. Of him it has been said that no one was better able to conceal the iron hand beneath the velvet glove.

The force under his command consisted of two brigades.

1st Brigade.

Brigadier C. S. Stuart.

One squadron 14th Light Dragoons

One troop 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry

Two regiments Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent

One troop Horse Artillery

One Light Field Battery

Two field batteries, Hyderabad Contingent
One company Native Pioneers
The 86th Regiment
The 25th Bombay Native Infantry
One regiment infantry, Hyderabad Contingent

This brigade was at Mau.

2nd Brigade. Brigadier Steuart.

14th Light Dragoons (less one squadron)
3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (less one troop)
One regiment cavalry (Hyderabad Contingent)
One battery Bombay Horse Artillery
One field battery (Hyderabad Contingent)
One company Madras Pioneers
The 3rd Bombay Europeans
The 24th Bombay Native Infantry
One regiment infantry (Hyderabad Contingent).

To this brigade was attached a small siege train.
The brigade was at Sihor.

It was impossible to commence operations until Whitlock's Madras column had reached Jabalpur.

By the 15th January the 2nd Brigade was concentrated at Sihor. On the 10th the 1st Brigade marched on Chandairi. On the 15th the 2nd Brigade with Sir Hugh Rose in person, left Sihor to attack Rathgarh. The force was reinforced by 800 Bhopal levies.

On the 24th Sir Hugh Rose arrived in front of Rathgarh and invested the town. On the 25th reconnaissances were made; the enemy attacked the baggage, but were driven off.

The fortress of Rathgarh is a very strong one, situated on the spur of a hill. The eastern and southern faces are built on a nearly perpendicular rock, washed by the Bina River. The western side faces the town; the northern face, with a ditch and wall, faces the jungle and the higher ground, on a spur of which the fortress stands.

On the 26th Sir Hugh Rose endeavoured to force his way through the jungle on the north, but the enemy set it on fire. Meanwhile the rest of the force occupied the town, and drove the garrison into the fort. A road was now cut through the jungle to the top of the spur. This spur runs north and south approximately.

On the 27th the breaching batteries opened. On the 28th a practicable breach had been made; on this day the Raja of Banpur approached to relieve the place, but was driven off by the cavalry. During the night 29th-30th the rebels evacuated the town.

On the 30th Sir Hugh, with part of the force, followed in pursuit and found the rebels in position near Baroda on the banks of the Bina River. The passage was forced and the rebels completely defeated.

Sagar had been held by the 31st Native Infantry, as previously recorded. Sir Hugh Rose reached that place on the 3rd February.

Despatching a small party to destroy a fort at Sanada,* on the 8th Sir Hugh marched on Garhakot, a fortress of very great strength. The fire of the artillery was so good that the rebels

* Not marked on Map.

evacuated the place in the night. They were pursued by a detachment of cavalry and horse artillery, and about a hundred were killed.

On the 19th Sir Hugh was again at Sagar.

Jhansi was the next point to be aimed at, but an immediate move could not be made, until Whitlock was able to leave Jabalpur. The delay was utilized to lay in great stocks of provisions and forage, fill up the siege train ammunition wagons, etc., procure elephants and other baggage animals, issue summer clothing, etc.

On the 26th February Sir Hugh marched in two columns. On the 27th he took Barodia, and on the 3rd found himself in front of the fortified pass of Maltun.

On the 4th he detailed a force of native troops to demonstrate, and with the remainder moved to Madanpur, with a view to turning the enemy's position, but the rebels were not to be deceived, and occupied the crests and the gorge leading to the higher table land in strong force. The 3rd Europeans and Haiderabad Infantry were ordered to storm the crests, but until a strong force of artillery was able to be deployed they found it impossible to advance; under cover of the artillery, a determined bayonet attack by the 3rd Europeans carried the crests. The enemy fled to Madanpur, but were turned out by howitzer fire and pursued to the walls of Sarai. The Maltun gorge was abandoned by the rebels.

The results of the victory were considerable, for the enemy abandoned all the strong places on the line of the Betwa and Bina except Chandairi.

The 1st Brigade reached Khukwasa, near Chandairi on the 5th March. The fortress of Chandairi is of very great strength, situated on a considerable hill. The town was formerly of very great importance. Advancing on the 6th, Stuart was not opposed, though jungles and ravines offered every facility to the enemy, until about a mile from Chandairi, when an enclosure was held by the rebels but soon cleared. Pushing on, Stuart occupied the hills west of the town. After a careful reconnaissance breaching batteries were opened on the 13th, and on the 17th the place was stormed. Unfortunately a letter with directions to the cavalry miscarried, and the rebels escaped pursuit.

Jhansi is a city of the greatest importance and was the scene of one of the most revolting of the massacres of the Mutiny; its capture was politically of the utmost importance.

On the 20th Sir Hugh Rose reached Chanchanpur and sent the Cavalry and Light Artillery to invest Jhansi. The same afternoon he received orders from Lord Canning and Sir Colin Campbell to move to the relief of the Raja of Charkari, then besieged by Tantia Topi. However, Sir Hugh Rose, supported by Sir Robert Hamilton, decided to continue the siege of Jhansi, for he considered that the importance of Jhansi was such that to leave it and turn off more than 100 miles away to the relief of a politically insignificant place like Charkari would be a grave error. There is no doubt that he was right.

The fortress of Jhansi stands on a great rock rising out of the plain, and is solidly and skilfully constructed of blocks of granite; except on the west it is surrounded by the town of Jhansi, a walled city of some $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles circumference. The garrison was some 11,000 men, mostly rebel Sepoys. The Rani herself was in command.

Sir Hugh arrived in front of the place on the 21st and spent the whole day in a very careful personal reconnaissance. On the 25th the batteries opened fire on the town and walls, for Sir Hugh had decided to take the city first. To complete the investment "flying camps," in which were placed detachments of cavalry supported by small detachments of infantry, were established on the faces of the town not covered by the actual siege operations.

Tantia Topi had retired from Cawnpore after his defeat by Sir Colin Campbell to Kalpi. Thence he proceeded to Charkari and captured that place, and under orders from the Rao Sahib now moved on Jhansi with his own men, the Gwalior contingent, and a large body of Nujibs, in all some 22,000 men and 28 guns. The position of the British Commander was one full of peril. If he raised the siege the political consequence would be serious, and the 11,000 men of the Rani would raise Tantia Topi's force to 33,000. Sir Hugh's total strength was barely 7,000 men. Sir Hugh therefore decided to meet Tantia Topi with the men not actually engaged in the siege operations. These amounted in all to but 1,500 men, of whom only 500 were British.

During the night Sir Hugh received information that a detachment of the rebels were passing the Betwa, with the intention of turning his left and entering Jhansi from the north. Sir Hugh was obliged to meet this movement and despatched that portion of his 1,500 men which belonged to the 1st Brigade under their Brigadier, Stuart, while he himself with the remainder, only about 900, awaited Tantia Topi's onset.

On the morning of the 1st April Tantia Topi deployed his force in two lines, the second commanded by himself in person, and thus advancing soon drove in the British piquets covering the detachments of the 2nd Brigade led by Sir Hugh in person. The British guns opened fire, but the enemy's advance was not checked. Sir Hugh then adopted one of the boldest manœuvres made in the whole history of the Mutiny.

He massed his horse artillery and sent it with an escort of a squadron of the 14th to enfilade the enemy's right; he himself with another squadron attacked the left. By this time the enemy's centre was close to the British line, and the natural confusion caused by these bold attacks caused it to hesitate. In that moment it was lost, for the 3rd Europeans springing to their feet fired a volley and went in with the bayonet. The first line broke and fell back on the second. At the same moment Stuart with the small detachment of the 1st Brigade attacked the right detachment of the rebels and drove it back on to the reserve.

Tantia Topi fired the jungle and fell back under cover of his guns across the Betwa. But the

British Cavalry and Horse Artillery were not to be denied, and the pursuit was pushed in spite of the burning jungle until every gun was captured and 1,500 rebels killed.

On the 3rd April, Jhansi was stormed, in spite of a desperate defence. In the storm the officers of the Bombay and Madras Engineers distinguished themselves in a most remarkable manner. Lieutenants Dick, Meiklejohn, Bonus and Fox were the first to escalate the walls and alone held the ladder heads for some minutes.

The Rani abandoned the fortress and fled to Kalpi. Detachments of the enemy took refuge in various places and defended themselves to the last.

The loss of Sir Hugh Rose's force in the operations was 36 officers and 307 men killed and wounded.

After re-organizing the district, collecting supplies, forage, etc., Sir Hugh left as a garrison a wing 3rd Europeans, a wing 24th Bombay N.I., a wing 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, some Sappers and Bhopal guns in Jhansi, and marched on the night 25th-26th towards Kota. Two days previously a detachment had preceded him to that place.

A detachment was sent to make a detour to prevent the rebels doubling back over the Betwa.

Under orders from the Rao Sahib, Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi advanced with a considerable force from Kalpi to Kunch, where he occupied a position.

On the 5th May Sir Hugh Rose's force increased by the arrival of the 71st Regiment, was concentrated at Putch.

On the night 6th-7th Sir Hugh moved to his left, and marched round the enemy's right and attacked him on the 7th. Tantia Topi was forced to retreat; unfortunately an error of direction of the 2nd Brigade allowed him to do this in good order, and the heat was so great that the Infantry could not follow, but the Cavalry did what they could. The enemy, however, retired very steadily, though they were obliged to abandon nine guns. The British loss was 61 killed and wounded and very many cases of sunstroke.

Advancing slowly on account of the heat, Sir Hugh marched on Golaoli on the Jumna. Here he was in communication with a column consisting of the 88th, the Camel Corps, and some Sikhs sent by Sir Colin Campbell to co-operate. He also avoided the fortifications on the Kalpi road.

Meanwhile the rebels had received an access of strength and took heart again.

Kalpi is strongly situated, the fort stands on a rock overlooking the Jumna, while the approach to the town on the other sides is over ground intersected in every direction by deep nullahs, which made the operations of Artillery and Cavalry very difficult. This difficult area was skilfully defended by the rebels.

On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th constant attacks were made by parties of rebels and all repulsed. On the latter day a portion of Maxwell's column crossed the Jumna and joined Sir Hugh.

By the 21st batteries were established by Maxwell on the left bank and Sir Hugh's batteries on his right front were in action all day. The

Camel Corps was sent over by Maxwell to reinforce Sir Hugh.

On the 22nd the enemy made a desperate and skilfully planned attack, a large force moving against Sir Hugh's more or less unguarded left flank. When a fierce attack there had, it was hoped, drawn the British reserves to that side, the main body suddenly appearing from the numerous nullahs fiercely attacked the British Centre. For a time the skirmishers were forced to fall back, but a dashing counter-charge cleared the front. At the same time on the left a successful charge drove the rebels back and they gave way everywhere. The broken rebels fled from Kalpi, abandoning their great arsenal and all their warlike stores.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of Sir Hugh Rose's march, whether considered from a political point of view or from the point of pure strategy. Like Sir Colin he was careful to prepare himself before making an advance. In all his engagements he made a personal reconnaissance before he acted. When he acted he did so with vigour and did not hesitate to set in every available man. His operations were conducted in the hot weather, yet the loss of his force by sickness and sunstroke did not prevent the men from moving with considerable rapidity.

General Whitlock's column, which was concentrating at Jabalpur, consisted of—

Cavalry Brigade : Colonel Lawrence.

12th Lancers.

6th and 7th Madras Cavalry.

Artillery Brigade : Colonel Miller.

Two troops Horse Artillery.

Two light Field Batteries.

Three Companies Foot Artillery.

First Infantry Brigade : Colonel Carpenter.

3rd Madras Europeans.

1st and 5th Madras Native Infantry.

Second Infantry Brigade : Colonel McDuff.

43rd Regiment.

19th Regiment.

A wing of the 50th Madras Native Infantry.
There was already a small force at Jabalpur :

33rd Madras Native Infantry.

Part of 4th and 6th Madras Cavalry, and
Some details, in all 1,600 men.

It was the 6th February before Whitlock reached Jabalpur. His force was then concentrated except the 2nd Brigade.

On the 17th he advanced very cautiously, keeping his whole body united, thus the rebels were only cleared away from his actual line of march. On the 5th March the column reached Sagar, where it halted till the 17th. Very cautiously and slowly advancing through Bandal-khand, he now marched in the direction of Banda. By spreading false information the Nawab of Banda prepared a very skilful ambush near Kabrai. Whitlock fell into the trap on the 18th and his troops were surprised ; the men, however, recovered in an instant and the enemy fled. The pursuit was ineffective.

On the 19th the advanced guard found the enemy on the plain south of Banda, covered by an

area of ground intersected by nullahs and water-courses and skilfully entrenched.

Apthorp, who commanded the advanced guard, was ordered to turn the right or west end of the series of nullahs, and the whole force advancing from nullah to nullah drove the enemy out of their position. The rebels lost heavily; the British loss was slight, only 39.

McDuff joined with his brigade on the 27th May having made a detour through the district to clear out the rebels.

Whitlock was now ordered to advance on Kirwi, which he did on the 2nd of June, and received the submission of the two young Rao.

The spoils of Banda and Kirwi were enormous and went to Whitlock's column, though the victories of Jhansi and Kalpi alone made possible his easy successes.

CHAPTER XII.

Final Operations.

The Lessons of the War.

The fall of Lucknow had not completely broken the rebel power in Oudh, and further operations were necessary. For the moment it was considered best to move against Rohilkhand, where the insurgents under Khan Bahadur Khan were collected at Bareilly.

Meanwhile Kunwar Singh had again become active in Behar and had re-occupied Azamgarh. He was defeated by a small column mainly composed of a wing of the 13th Regiment under Lord Mark Kerr. To pacify Behar, Lugard was despatched with a strong column. A strong force, 2nd Dragoon Guards, eight Regiments of Infantry, four batteries, and a siege train, were left to protect Lucknow.

To attack Bareilly four columns were directed to converge on that point, Walpole, Penny and Jones moving from Lucknow, Seaton from Fatehgarh.

But for an unfortunate repulse to Walpole's column at the fort of Ruyah,* where the gallant Adrian Hope was killed, the operations were all successful. The battle of Bareilly, on the 5th May, was chiefly remarkable for a most deter-

* Not marked on map.

mined charge by a body of Ghazi swordsmen. The weather was too hot to press the pursuit, and during the night 5th to 6th May Khan Bahadur Khan was able to slip away. The rebels joined their friends in Oudh.

After the fall of Kalpi, Sir Hugh Rose's force had expected some rest, but the rebels had a piece of good fortune which forced Sir Hugh to prompt action. Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi, flying towards Gwalior, were met by Maharajah Sindhia with his forces. Sindhia's troops deserted; thus the rebels became possessed of the treasure and munitions of war in Gwalior.

Sir Hugh Rose pursued Tantia Topi, caught him up and beat him at Morar, close to Gwalior, where the Rani of Jhansi was killed. Tantia Topi fled to Oudh.

Behar was pacified after tedious operations by Lugard.

To destroy the rebels in Oudh many small columns were formed which, moving swiftly, surrounded the rebel bands and constantly depleted their numbers.

The operations were of the most trying character, far more so than the great operations of the war, and were carried out with great success and great endurance on the part of the troops. Mounted riflemen were employed for the first time, and proved of the utmost service. The driving and sweeping operations bear a certain similarity to those of the latter stages of the Boer war. The rebel leaders, who displayed great agility in escaping their pursuers, were finally cap-

tured, killed, or driven into the swamps which bound Nepal.

2 [It was not till November, 1859, that the last body of rebels surrendered in Oudh, and the last flickering embers of revolt were crushed out.

7 | Before this, however, the great company which had won India for the Empire had been dissolved, and the Queen of England proclaimed Sovereign of India. From that time the country, wisely and justly governed, has enjoyed peace within her borders.

In the first chapter some of the main causes of discontent among the princes and people of India were mentioned. Those particular causes have practically vanished now, yet it must be admitted that British rule is not altogether beloved by our subject peoples. It is childish to cry out against the ingratitude of these peoples. True, we have taken to them peace and plenty, the population has increased out of all measure, justice is done without respect of persons, and, so far as the British Indian Civil Servants are able to prevent it, the poor man is safe from the persecution or extortion of the rich or powerful. Yet against all this must be set the fact that the British are an alien race. It is painfully true that a nation prefers to be badly governed by its own people than well governed by aliens. At first, after a period of anarchy, no doubt the blessings of peace and prosperity appear cheap at the price of liberty; but, after a few years, the price paid begins to seem excessive. When, as in the case of India, a class of men arises, as well educated

as the officials of the dominant power, and taught to believe that knowledge and learning, not character, are the most necessary qualifications for administrative posts, and when these men find that the avenues to the highest posts in the administration are closed to them, as they believe, on account of their colour, we have at once the germs of revolt emplant, and the leaders ready made.

It may be considered that these remarks, brief and superficial as they are, are not germane to the consideration of the military lessons of the great revolt. Strategy and military policy must, however, take note of the political condition of an enemy. As was pointed out in the introduction, in dealing with an insurrection or a rebellion a very different strategical course of action is required from that necessitated in a war with an exterior enemy, the essential difference as a rule is that in the case of exterior war we generally can prepare systematically for the war and are able to take our own time. It is exactly the reverse with a rebellion.

NB

The Mutiny affords us admirably clear facts from which to deduce a theory of action in the event of a revolt in India, in which large bodies of men should be collected by the rebels.

The first object is to strike hard and quickly, yet it is vitally necessary to ensure success, for one defeat or even slight reverse may fan the smouldering sparks of discontent into a great blaze of rebellion. To combine these two considerations, speed and certainty of success, requires:

the most difficult and delicate handling. Extreme boldness and audacity will go far, and it is evident from the Mutiny that a small and mobile force is capable of paralysing, as it were, the movements of insurgents.

In India, should a great and widespread rebellion break out, it would be in the highest degree improbable that the various bodies of insurgents in the different districts would be willing to combine under the command of one leader, be he Mahommedan or Hindu.

Even were this not the case, it is not to be expected that the rebels would throw up any great leader, capable of initiating and carrying through combined operations; still more unlikely is it that many of the less powerful leaders would work wholly together for a common cause.

Insurgent leaders generally fight each man for his own hand. No doubt groups of insurgents combine at times for certain specific and immediately attainable objects, which being attained the combination soon breaks down. Lastly the insurgents, from the necessities of the case, do not possess control of the machinery of Government, and have difficulty in creating the administrative departments which alone make an army mobile.

We may therefore generally expect to find, even in a general and widespread rebellion, the rebel forces separated in various more or less distinct bodies, practically confined each to its own locality, and incapable of continuous movement beyond that locality. To prevent the insurrection

spreading it will be best to attack each of these separate forces at once. Where the necessary force to take the offensive is not on the spot, a show of activity must be made while the reinforcements are arriving. Lastly before the final move against any particular body of rebels is made, every possible precaution consistent with rapidity must be taken to ensure the movement being carried right through without pause. There is nothing that so demoralizes irregulars as restless energy ; when the irregulars are Asiatics continued movement is still more efficacious.

The circumstances of the case will almost necessitate an advance into the theatre of war from several directions. This arrangement is often dangerous in regular warfare, but in dealing with rebel forces such as might be met with in India the objections are to a great extent invalid. To obtain the full value from the " interior lines " situation, an army must be highly mobile and efficient.

As we have seen, this will not be the case with such an enemy. It seems that in this particular class of war Colonel Callwell's doctrine that strategy favours the enemy does not quite hold good, and in fact he points this out himself. At the same time the amplification of his doctrine that the object of the regulars must be to fight not to manœuvre is abundantly true.

In dealings with Asiatics it has invariably been found that the general population favours the stronger party. If therefore the regulars are able

to inflict decisive defeats on the rebels, and at the same time appear from various directions, the impression of superiority will be enhanced. An enemy such as will be met with in such a war even if willing and anxious to concentrate under one leader will almost certainly be drawn to disperse his forces by the advance of the regulars from several directions.

Sir Hugh Rose's campaign in Central India affords very convincing proof of the truth of these assertions. The enemy never combined to oppose him; though it is true such an attempt was made by Tantia Topi, but the attempt was made too late.

His advance in two columns found opposition equally divided in front of each. His bold and swift operations paralysed his opponents and caused them to abandon strong positions, such as the line of the Betwa, almost without fighting. His victories were always relentlessly followed up. He did not move until prepared to carry his projected movement through to a conclusion.

With regard to tactics, it is apparent that the utmost boldness is necessary. A bayonet charge is the solution of almost every tactical problem. To enable an infantry inferior in numbers to push a bayonet charge home against the invariably superior numbers of the enemy, the guns must support the attack with the utmost boldness. For this purpose, not only must field guns push in to close range, but horse and field artillery must be employed in flanking movements. For the attack of houses heavy artillery is absolutely

essential, otherwise the loss of life to the infantry in storming the buildings will be excessive.

Walpole's reverse before Ruyah, and Frank's reverse at Dhowra, are instances of the want of this careful preparation. It was the custom to sneer at Sir Colin Campbell's extreme caution and care, but such instances as those quoted go to prove the necessity for such forethought. It should seldom be necessary to involve the infantry in street fighting; the better method being to shell the enemy out of the buildings and disperse them with cavalry as they fall back.

There must always be a pursuit by cavalry. This is absolutely essential to complete a success. The loss of stores, guns and baggage has a comparatively small effect on the rebel's moral. This is only effectually shattered by ruthless pursuit. Every effort must be made to so arrange matters that there will be no necessity to retire, either to go into camp, or for any other purpose. Several instances have been noted in the course of the narrative of the way in which the rebels rallied and pursued when the British gave up a pursuit, notably after Sassiah.

In a tactical as in a strategical sense, well timed combined movements have the most happy effect, and a flank attack which combines well with a frontal attack has a value altogether out of proportion to the numbers engaged.

It would seem that every detachment, however small, should be composed of the three arms. The value of cavalry is exceptionally great in

such warfare. It is probable that had Windham had 500 horsemen at Cawnpore he would have defeated Tantia Topi instead of suffering a reverse. The effect that even a retirement has on the enemy's moral has been already touched on. If a victory cannot be followed up, a retirement often becomes inevitable; the following up of success can only be performed by cavalry.

The courage of the opponents must not be placed at too low a value, but at the same time it must be admitted that in the Mutiny the courage of the rebels in the open field, particularly that of their cavalry, was conspicuous by its absence. Mr. Sherer, who accompanied Havelock from Allahabad to Cawnpore, particularly notices the "laughable" way in which rebel cavalry declined to come to close quarters. Though this was common in the Mutiny on many occasions, it must be remembered that it was not always so.

Perhaps it will never happen again that British rule in India will be subjected to such an ordeal as in those terrible summer months of 1858. If it should come it is to be hoped that it will be met with the prompt and resolute action that the History of the Indian Mutiny teaches us to be essential, and that among soldiers and civilians alike will be found many such men as the Laurences, Nicholson, Durand, Bartle Frere, Neill, Havelock, and a thousand others, for if there is one lesson above all that we may learn from the Mutiny it is the inestimable value of the personal element in India.

APPENDIX I.

Distribution of Troops in India at outbreak of Mutiny. Detachments are not shown. They were very numerous in Madras.

Bengal Presidency District.

Station.	British.			Native.			
	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries of Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Companies of Engineers
Fort William							
Alipur							
Baliganj		1	2	Governor General's Body-guard	5	7	
Barrackpur							
Dum-Dum							
Berhampur				1	1	1	
Midnapur						1	
Chittagong						1	
Aracan						1	
Jalpaigori					1	1	
Cherrapunji						1	
Dibrugar						1	
Gauhatti						1	
		1	2	1	7	15	

Danapur Division.

Danapur	1	1				3	
Segauli						1	
Bhagalpur						1	
Darjeeling							2
Doranda				1		1	
Hazaribagh						1	
Benares	1					3	
Ghazipur						1	
Chunar			{ Invalid Batt.				
Mirzapur						1	
Azamgarh					1	1	
Bansi				1		1	
		2	1	2	1	14	2

APPENDIX I. (continued).

Cawnpore District.

Station.	British.			Native.			
	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Regiments of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Companies of Engineers.
Cawnpore		1	89 Men	1	1	3	
Fattehgarh					1	1	
Banda							
Etawah						1	
Mainpuri							
Lucknow		1	1	1	1	3	
Faizabad				Detachment	1	1	
Sitapur				1		1	
Sultanpur				1			
Allahabad					1	2	
Nowgong				1	1	1	
Jhansi				1	1	1	
		2	1	6	7	14	

Sagar District.

Sagar		1		1		2	
Jabalpur						1	
Mau		1		1		1	
Nagode						1	
Nimach				1	2	2	
Nasirabad				1	1	2	
		2	1	4	3	9	

APPENDIX I. *(continued).*

Meerut Division.

Station.	British.			Native.			
	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Companies of Engineers
Meerut	1	3	1	1		2	
Delhi					1	3	
Aligarh						1	
Dehra						1	
Agra		1	1	Detachment		2	
Bareilly				1	1	2	
Moraddabad						1	
Shahjehanpur					1	1	
Almora					1	1	
Bawar						1	
	1	4	2	2	4	15	

Sirhind Division.

Ambala	1	2	1	1		Detachment	
Juttogh						1	
Dugshai			1				
Kasauli			1				
Sabathu			1				
Jalandar		1	1			2	
Phillaur					1	1	
Hosheypur				Detachment		1	
Rurkhi							2
	1	3	5	1	1	5	2

APPENDIX I. (continued)

Lahore Division.

Station.	British.			Native.			
	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Companies of Engineers
Lahore		5	1	1		3	
Amritsar					2		
Govindgarh					1	1	
Firuzpur		2	1	1		2	
Gurdaspur				1			
Sialkot		2	1			2	
Nurpur	}						
Kangra					1	1	
Multan		1		1	1	2	
		10	3	4	5	11	

Peshawar Division.

Peshawar		6	2	3		5	1
Attock					1	1	1
Shamsabad				1			
Naushara			1	1		1	
Rawal Pindi			1	1	1	2	
Jhelam					1	2	
		6	4	6	3	11	2

Madras Centre Division.

St. Thomas Mt.		4	1 and a wing		2	4	
Arcot				1		1	
Nellore						1	
Bangalore	wing	2	wing	1		2	
Seringapatam						2	
Madukarai		1				1	
Mangalur						1	
	1	7	2	2	2	12	

APPENDIX I. (continued).

Madras Northern Division.

Station.	British.			Native.			
	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Companies of Engineers
Masulipatam						2	
Russelkondah						1	
Vizianagram						1	
Berhampur						1	
Cuttuck						1	
Vizagapatam			Veteran Battalion			1	
Dhavaleshvaram							10
						7	10

Madras Southern Division.

Trichinopoli		1		1		3	
Palayamkottai		1				1	
Quilon						2	
Jackatalla			1				
Kannanur			det.			1	
Calicut			det.				
Maliyapuram			det.				
Bellari				1		1	
Kadapa						1	
Karnul						1	
		2	1	2		10	

Hyderabad Division.

Hyderabad		1	1	1	2	5	
Jalna				1			
Kamthi		2		1		3	
Hoshangabad						1	
		3	1	3	2	9	

APPENDIX I. (continued).

Burmah Pegu Division under Madras.

Station.	British.			Native.			
	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Companies of Engineers
Rangoon		3				7	
Thayetmyo		1	wing				
Henzada						1	
Thougwao			1			2	
Moulmein		1	wing			2	
		5	2			12	

Bombay Southern Division.

Bombay		2	wing			4	
Belgaum		2	Depot 64th Regt.			2	
Sholapur				1	1	1	
Dharwar						1	
Kolapur						1	
		4	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	9	

Poona Division.

Poona	} Wing and Depot 14th L.D.	1	1			2	
and Kirki			and Depot 78th H.				
Ahmednagar		2			1	1	
Malegaon					1	1	
Satara				1		1	
Dapoli						1	
	$\frac{1}{2}$	3	1	1	2	6	

APPENDIX I. (continued).

Bombay Northern Division.

Station.	British.			Native.			
	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regts. of Artillery.	Regts. of Cavalry.	Batteries or Companies Artillery.	Regiments of Infantry.	Companies of Engineers
Ahmedabad					1	2	
Baroda					1	2	
Rajkot				1		1	
Disa		1	1			2	
		1	1	1	2	7	

Sindh District.

Karachi			1 and Depot			3	
Hyderabad					1	1	
Shikarpur					2	1	
Assegur						1	
			1		3	6	

Persian Field Force.

	1	8	3	3	2	6	4
--	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Aden.

		1	Wing		1	1	
--	--	---	------	--	---	---	--

APPENDIX I. (*continued*).

N.B.—It must be specially noted that the British Horse Batteries and the Companies which formed Field and Siege Batteries, consisted about half of British, half of native troops. In very many cases the native gunners and drivers deserted and joined the mutineers, thus increasing their numbers of trained artillerymen.

This list accounts for the whole of the European Force and for

Thirty-eight Regiments of Cavalry

One hundred and seventy-eight Regiments of Infantry

of the Native Army.

There were four native Infantry Corps employed in Singapore, Hongkong and the Andaman Islands, three had been disbanded before the outbreak of revolt and five more were newly raised on the frontiers or were scattered in detachments, making up the total of 190 Native Infantry Regiments.

With regard to the Cavalry, one Regiment had been disbanded before the outbreak of revolt, it is not quite clear how the remaining three of the total of 42 were distributed.

APPENDIX II.

Total number of Troops despatched to India from England who arrived at their destination, showing numbers that arrived each month.

	At Calcutta		At Madras		At Bombay		At Karachi		Total	
	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men
1857										
Oct.	93	2589	4	300					97	2889
Nov.	525	12319	119	2954	19	476	80	1928	743	17677
Dec.	43	950	56	1264	189	4743	31	720	319	7677
1858										
Jan.	6	186	30	478	30	636	83	2154	149	3454
Feb.			13	265	53	1484			65	1749

N.B.—Of these troops 199 officers and 4894 men travelled by the overland route.

9 officers and 200 men were also sent to Aden.

Total	1374	33446
Add Reliefs sent out	227	5119
Grand Total	1601	31565

APPENDIX III.

Complete list of Reinforcements and Reliefs sent to India. Not all were employed.

Seven Regiments of Cavalry (two sent in relief)

2nd Dragoon Guards	3rd Dragoon Guards
1st " "	7th " "
7th Hussars	8th Light Dragoons
17th Light Dragoons	

Thirty-nine Regiments of Infantry (four in relief)

From England :—7th 19th 20th 34th 38th 42nd
 44th 54th 56th 3rd/60th 79th 66th
 72nd 88th 97th 2nd/R.B. 3rd R.B. 18th
 51st 98th 94th 68th 69th 71st
 92nd

From China Expeditionary Force :—23rd 82nd 90th 93rd

From Mauritius :—Wing 4th 5th 33rd

From Ceylon :—Wing 37th

From Cape Colony :—13th 89th 95th 2nd/60th 73rd
 80th 31st

Four Troops Royal Horse Artillery
 Seven Field Batteries Royal Artillery
 Seventeen Companies Royal Artillery
 Five Companies R.E.

APPENDIX IV.

The railways in India in 1908, and the effect the existence of such a system in 1857 would have had on the course of the Mutiny.

Inset in Map I. is a small map showing the principal railway lines existing in India to-day. In addition a large number of branch lines form a network of railroads over the whole country, particularly numerous in the portions belonging to the British, and less numerous in the native States.

Without going fully into the matter, it may be possible to indicate the more obvious of the results the existence of such a network of railways would have had on the course of the Mutiny.

When the Mutiny broke out at Meerut one of the earliest acts of the mutineers was to cut the telegraph wires, and it can hardly be doubted that had there at that time been railways, all lines leading from the Punjab would have been destroyed by them. The speed with which Anson could have collected his force with the necessary transport at Ambala would no doubt have been somewhat improved by the use of the lines leading back to the Punjab. So far, however, the existence of railways would not materially have affected the issue.

In the Punjab, on the other hand, as the people remained loyal very little dislocation would have

occurred to the railway traffic, and the work of Chamberlain's (afterwards Nicholson's) movable column would have been far more speedily accomplished. It is, however, probable that the marches of this column through the length and breadth of the Punjab had a very good political effect, by showing the British arms throughout the country; this effect would have been lost had the column moved from place to place by rail. However that may be, its work would have been accomplished with much greater rapidity, and it would have been free much earlier to move to the assistance of the Delhi force. The losses by battle and sickness reduced the original Delhi force by many hundreds of men during the months that elapsed before the arrival of the movable column and of the siege train; these losses would have been obviated by the earlier arrival of the Punjab reinforcements at Delhi, and it is reasonable to conclude that Delhi would therefore have fallen in July and not in September.

Turning to the other side of the theatre of war, in view of the fact that Behar was at first passive, and that the 1st Madras Europeans and 84th Regiment could, had railways existed, have been at Benares and Allahabad by the 25th May, we may I think fairly assume that Cawnpore would have been relieved. A delay would, however, have then occurred, before Havelock would have received the reinforcement from the Persian Expeditionary Force and the China Expeditionary Force. It cannot therefore be fairly assumed that Lucknow could have been relieved by Havelock's first attempt.

In considering the advantages for Havelock's advance of railways communications as far as Allahabad, one must not lose sight of the fact that Havelock's losses were principally from sickness; much of this would have been avoided by a better system of transport to the front, his force would therefore have been larger, and his first attempt to enter Lucknow might have succeeded.

On the Bombay side, in the same way, Durand at Mau could have been more quickly reinforced.

To the rebels it does not appear that railways would have been of much service.

It is probable from previous experience that one of the first acts of the rebels would have been to destroy all the railways within their zone of occupation. It is in the highest degree unlikely that they would have tried to employ them to move their troops from one side of the theatre of war to another, with a view to utilizing their strategically satisfactory position, holding as they did the "interior lines." With regard to the great numbers employed on the lines of communication it does not seem that railways would have economized on this point. The line from Calcutta would have had to have been guarded by as many men as were actually employed in the Mutiny in safeguarding the road.

On the whole, however, we may say that railways would have very greatly facilitated the task of the British. The prompt relief of Cawnpore and the saving of valuable lives lost there and daily lost by sickness would have enabled the British to localize the disturbances far more readily. It is quite possible that the Behar

mutinies would never have taken place had it been possible to deal more promptly with the Cawnpore rebels.

In the latter stages of the war and in the guerrilla operations railways would not have helped the British very largely except that they would have greatly reduced the amount of transport it was necessary to collect.

To sum up we may say that the existence of a railway system in India in 1857 such as now exists would have been wholly in favour of the British, have enabled them to localize the disturbances, to relieve Cawnpore, to capture Delhi much sooner, and by hastening the operations to avoid the terrible wastage by sickness.



DS
478
S43

Sedgwick, Francis Rodgers
The Indian mutiny of
1857

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

